U (Children)

In an appeal from a case-management decision, the Court of Appeal may intervene only where the judge erred in principle, considered irrelevant matters, omitted relevant matters, or reached a conclusion outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement. That restraint applies even where the interlocutory decision may materially affect the ultimate outcome, but the judge must account for that potential prejudice in the balancing exercise. In deciding whether to adjourn an application to reopen care findings, the court must weigh the applicant’s ability to present an effective challenge against the children’s welfare, the statutory importance of avoiding delay and the need for finality. A review of earlier findings requires solid grounds for challenge; speculation or hope is insufficient.

Care proceedings concerning four children resulted in findings of physical and emotional abuse, domestic violence and sexual abuse, followed by care orders for all four children and placement orders for the twins. The father was later acquitted in criminal proceedings concerning the sexual-abuse allegations and applied to stay the orders and reopen the care proceedings under section 31F(6) of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984.

His application for an adjournment, to obtain a transcript of the criminal trial, was refused by His Honour Judge Wilding. The substantive application for a rehearing was also refused. The appeal concerned whether those refusals were wrong and whether there were sufficient grounds to revisit the earlier findings.

1. Appeal dismissed. The refusal of a further adjournment was a case-management decision. Applying Re B and the guidance in Re TG, the Court of Appeal could intervene only for an error of principle, reliance on irrelevant matters, failure to consider relevant matters, or a conclusion outside the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement.
2. The judge properly balanced the father’s potential prejudice against the children’s welfare, the statutory importance of avoiding delay under section 1(2) of the Children Act 1989, the statutory timetable under section 32, and the need for finality. He had taken the father’s case at its highest and was entitled to conclude that further substantial delay could not be countenanced.
3. The sexual-abuse findings were not the sole foundation of the care orders. Extensive findings of physical and emotional abuse and domestic violence remained, supported by evidence independent of the sexual-abuse allegations.
4. The substantive application was properly assessed under the three-stage approach in Re ZZ. The first stage requires a real reason and solid grounds for believing that an earlier finding requires revisiting. Mere speculation and hope are insufficient. The father’s unsupported assertions did not meet that threshold.
5. The different standards of proof and potentially wider evidential base in the care proceedings were relevant. The criminal acquittal therefore did not, without more, establish grounds for reopening the care findings.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the father’s appeal against the order made by His Honour Judge Wilding in the Watford County Court on 12 December 2014.