Reeve v Reeve

Where an application challenges or seeks to stay orders made in family financial-relief proceedings, and the court considers the Family Division the proper forum, it is arguable that the application should be left to that Division rather than determined elsewhere. A litigant in person may also have an arguable procedural-fairness complaint where dismissal rests heavily on delay that was not squarely raised at the hearing. Permission was granted on those grounds. The Court of Appeal did not determine the underlying constructive-trust or proprietary-estoppel claim.

This was a renewed application by William Reeve for permission to appeal against an order made by His Honour Judge Purle QC in the Chancery Division on 20 November 2014. The application concerned a stay of the proposed sale of the family Ledingham Estate and pre-action disclosure. Mr Reeve claimed an interest in the estate through constructive trust or proprietary estoppel.

Both parents’ representatives submitted that the Family Division was the appropriate forum because the relevant orders arose from existing financial-relief proceedings. The Chancery judge nevertheless dismissed the applications, relying principally on delay. The central questions were whether the judge should have left the matter to the Family Division and whether reliance on an unargued delay point caused procedural unfairness.

Lord Justice Lewison granted permission to appeal. The Court of Appeal was concerned only with whether the proposed grounds were arguable, not with the merits of the alleged constructive trust or proprietary estoppel.

1. Proper forum. Both sides had urged that the Family Division was the appropriate forum for dealing with the application, including the challenge to orders made in the family proceedings and the abuse-of-process issue. The Chancery judge had recognised that the Family Division was the only proper place where those matters could be overcome, if at all, and that it was for the Family Court to determine whether its procedure had been abused. It was therefore realistically arguable that the judge should have transferred or left the application to the Family Division instead of deciding it himself.
2. Procedural fairness. The principal reason given for refusing the stay was delay. That issue did not appear to have been squarely raised in the skeleton arguments. Since the applicant was acting in person, it was at least arguable that there was unfairness in relying heavily on a point which had not been properly advanced before the hearing.
3. Pre-action disclosure and further directions. Mr Reeve accepted that it would be preferable to await standard disclosure in any subsequent proceedings. His application to adduce fresh evidence concerning delay was adjourned because the respondents had not had an opportunity to oppose it. The appeal was ordered to be expedited because of the potential effect on the proposed sale.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 19 May 2015, Lord Justice Lewison granted permission to appeal against the order of His Honour Judge Purle QC. The application to adduce fresh evidence was adjourned to the court hearing the substantive appeal, and the hearing was expedited.
2. Leeds District Registry, Chancery Division: On 20 November 2014, His Honour Judge Purle QC dismissed the applications for a stay of the sale and pre-action disclosure and made costs orders.