BP (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Permission for a second appeal is granted only where the proposed appeal raises an important point of principle or practice, or there is another compelling reason for the appellate court to hear it. Where an appellant elects to pursue an appeal rather than enforce an agreement recorded in a consent order, the appeal proceeds under the tribunal’s ordinary powers. The tribunal may therefore evaluate the evidence itself where it has considered, and rejected, an adjournment or remittal. Disagreement with the tribunal’s assessment of evidence, credibility or medical material will not ordinarily constitute a compelling reason for a second appeal.

The claimant, a Pakistani Ahmadi, claimed asylum on the basis that she would face persecution on return. Earlier judicial review proceedings were settled by consent, with the Secretary of State agreeing to make a further immigration decision considering additional submissions, including medical evidence concerning the claimant’s mental state. The Secretary of State did not make the contemplated decision. The First-tier Tribunal instead heard the claimant’s appeal, considered the additional evidence and rejected the asylum claim. On a renewed application for permission to appeal against the Upper Tribunal’s decision of 28 November 2013, the central issue was whether the First-tier Tribunal should have remitted the matter to the Secretary of State rather than assessing the evidence itself.

1. Application refused. The renewed application did not disclose an arguable second appeal point or any compelling reason for permission.
2. Second appeal threshold. Permission for a second appeal requires an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for the appellate court to hear the matter. The proposed question concerning the First-tier Tribunal’s powers did not meet that threshold.
3. Effect of the claimant’s election. The consent order gave the claimant a choice between enforcing the agreement recorded in it and appealing the previous immigration decision. Having chosen to appeal, she entered the ordinary appeal process, in which the tribunal had its normal powers.
4. Tribunal’s evidential role. The First-tier Tribunal had considered whether to adjourn the matter and had decided that an adjournment was inappropriate. In those circumstances, it was entitled, and had no realistic alternative, to evaluate the medical evidence for itself. It was not required to send the case back to the Secretary of State for a fresh decision.
5. The remaining grounds concerned the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of the daughter’s evidence, the alleged support available in Pakistan and the medical evidence. Those were ordinary evidential assessments and did not amount to a compelling reason for a second appeal. Permission was accordingly refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 21 May 2015, Lady Justice Arden refused the renewed application for permission to appeal.
• Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) — The application arose from the Upper Tribunal’s decision dated 28 November 2013. No citation is stated in the judgment.
• First-tier Tribunal — Judge Kimnell considered the claimant’s appeal, including the further medical evidence, and rejected the challenge to the immigration decision.
• Earlier judicial review proceedings — Proceedings were settled by consent, with the Secretary of State agreeing to make a further immigration decision considering the claimant’s further submissions.