Mamo v London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham

A continuing public-law duty does not permit a claimant to postpone judicial review indefinitely and choose when to challenge the breach. The claimant must act promptly once the claim arises and explain any delay. The absence of a statutory time limit does not displace that requirement. Although a continuing breach may justify an extension in an appropriate case, the date on which it began remains relevant. A fresh homelessness application may also be an adequate alternative remedy despite changes in the statutory and regulatory framework, unless material differences making it inadequate are identified.

The applicant, a refugee with UK citizenship and in poor health, challenged the London Borough of Hammersmith & Fulham’s alleged failure to determine her homelessness application under Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. She argued that the authority’s duty under section 184 was continuing because it had provided accommodation without formally determining or ending the homelessness duty.

The Administrative Court refused permission for judicial review, holding that the claim was brought neither within time nor promptly and that a Part 7 application was an adequate alternative remedy. Permission to appeal was refused on paper. On renewal, the Court of Appeal considered whether the alleged continuing duty prevented time from running and whether a fresh homelessness application was an adequate alternative remedy.

1. Permission refused. The High Court judge had not arguably erred in refusing permission on delay grounds.
2. A claimant cannot rely on the characterisation of a public-law obligation as a continuing duty to sit back and select the time for bringing judicial review. Time runs when the claim first arises. The requirement of promptness and speedy certainty remains applicable even where Parliament has imposed no express time limit for the authority’s decision.
3. The fact that a breach may be continuing does not make the date on which it began irrelevant. Particular circumstances may justify an extension of time, but the claimant must act promptly and explain the delay. The approach in R (Nash) v Barnet LBC [2013] EWCA Civ 1004 was applied. The subtleties concerning extensions were noted by reference to Burkett [2002] 1 WLR 1593.
4. The court was also disinclined to grant permission because a fresh homelessness application remained possible. Changes made by the Localism Act produced differences in the legal and regulatory regime, but the applicant identified no particular difference showing that the alternative remedy was inadequate.
5. The applicant accepted that there was no material before the court justifying the delay on the principal ground. The renewed application was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): renewed application for permission to appeal refused.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division (Administrative Court): permission to apply for judicial review refused on the grounds of delay and an adequate alternative remedy.
• Permission stage: permission to appeal was refused on the papers by Gloster LJ on 19 January 2015; the application was renewed.