Goss v BM Samuels Finance Group Plc

On a second appeal, an alleged misassessment of evidence or failure to apply an established principle will not ordinarily justify permission. The applicant must identify an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason. A challenge to refusal to admit further evidence may be considered under the ordinary permission criteria without converting the remaining grounds into a first appeal. Evidence of collateral wrongdoing is relevant only where it has some connection with the conduct said to have caused the present loss. Suspicion, association and speculative reasoning are insufficient without a coherent case theory connecting the alleged misconduct to the pleaded default.

This was a renewed application for permission to appeal against a decision of Mr John Baldwin QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge. The decision followed an appeal from the Master’s summary judgment for the respondent. Grounds 1 to 3 alleged misassessment of evidence, failure properly to apply summary-judgment principles, and failure to scrutinise a suspicious state of affairs. Ground 4 challenged the refusal to admit further evidence concerning the respondent’s relationship with Mr Spencer and alleged misconduct on other projects. The central issues were whether the grounds satisfied the second-appeal criteria and whether the further evidence was capable of assisting the defence.

Lord Justice Underhill, giving the single judgment, refused permission to appeal.

1. Grounds 1 to 3 did not satisfy the restricted second-appeal criteria in CPR 52.13(2). An alleged misassessment of evidence, or failure properly to apply an established principle, does not ordinarily raise an important point of principle or practice. No other compelling reason to hear the appeal was shown.
2. The substance of ground 1 disclosed no plausible basis for concluding that funding the later Treetops project necessarily prejudiced the Audley Way project. Ground 2 likewise raised no question of principle. The relevant EasyAir principle required some good reason for thinking that the defendant could improve its case at trial; the evidence supplied no such reason. This was distinct from Micawberism.
3. Ground 3 did not establish a point of principle. The circumstances were materially less suspicious than those considered in Miles v Bull. The respondent’s failure to pursue Mr Spencer on his guarantee, and the continued engagement of an allegedly impecunious contractor, did not justify the inferential leap that the respondent had caused the original default.
4. For ground 4, the court proceeded on the basis that the ordinary permission criteria applied to the challenge to the refusal to admit further evidence. That did not require the other grounds to be treated as a first appeal. Burgess concerned a different question.
5. Even assuming that the further evidence suggested commercial misconduct in other projects, the court would not admit contested collateral evidence merely because it might prejudice the respondent. There had to be some connection between the alleged wrongdoing and what caused the debtor’s default in the present case. No coherent case theory made that connection. The proposed inference was purely and implausibly speculative, and the evidence could not prove or assist in proving the defence. Since ground 4 was not arguable, permission was refused.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Refused a renewed application for permission to appeal.
• High Court of Justice, Chancery Division: Mr John Baldwin QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, dismissed the appeal from the Master’s summary judgment.
• Master: Granted summary judgment for the respondent.