Laville v CWM TAF Local Health Board

Permission to appeal will be refused where the proposed grounds merely challenge detailed factual findings that the appellate court cannot properly reopen. A first-instance employment tribunal has a broad discretion over amendments, and may refuse an amendment that would expand the hearing or require an adjournment, particularly where the substance of the proposed claim has already been considered. A tribunal is not required to address lengthy evidence at disproportionate length if it has considered the material issues and dealt with them sufficiently. A costs order within the tribunal’s discretion, upheld by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, will not ordinarily be disturbed.

The applicant was employed as a psychologist therapist by the respondent. After resigning, she claimed constructive unfair dismissal, alleging numerous breaches of contract, and brought financial claims. Following a four-day hearing and consideration of extensive evidence, the Employment Tribunal rejected the principal claims and ordered her to pay £1,487.50 in costs.

The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed her appeal against both the substantive decision and the costs order. Lewison LJ refused permission to appeal on the papers. The applicant renewed her application orally before the Court of Appeal, challenging findings about job evaluation, regrading, amendments to her claim, her role at Pontypridd, and costs. The central question was whether any proposed ground was arguable and capable of succeeding on appeal.

1. Permission refused. The proposed appeal would fail and there was no proper basis for reopening the Employment Tribunal’s detailed findings of fact. The tribunal had heard evidence from eight witnesses, considered approximately 800 pages of written evidence, and preferred the respondent’s account on the central factual disputes. The Court of Appeal could not reopen those findings after such a hearing.
2. The proposed complaint about job evaluation and regrading could not succeed. Even if the amendment should have been permitted, the Employment Tribunal had dealt with the substance of the issue and found no contractual entitlement or breach. The Employment Appeal Tribunal was legally correct to treat the relevant factual findings as unchallengeable on appeal.
3. Leave to amend a claim is a matter for the first-instance tribunal’s discretion. It was right in principle to refuse an amendment which would expand the hearing or require an adjournment, causing substantial cost and wasting tribunal time. In any event, the substance of the applicant’s complaint was present in the claim form and had been considered by both tribunals.
4. The Employment Tribunal had considered the applicant’s evidence, although it dealt with it concisely. That was sufficient. The applicant’s complaints concerning her new role and management structure at Pontypridd raised factual issues and disclosed no material breach of contract on the tribunal’s findings.
5. The costs order had been properly considered and upheld by the Employment Appeal Tribunal. It was within the Employment Tribunal’s remit and was not an order with which the Court of Appeal should interfere. Permission to appeal was therefore refused.

• Employment Tribunal: The applicant’s constructive dismissal and financial claims were rejected after a four-day hearing. The tribunal ordered her to pay £1,487.50 in costs.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: The applicant’s appeal against the substantive decision and costs order was dismissed.
• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Lewison LJ refused permission on the papers. On renewal, Jackson LJ refused the application for permission to appeal.