Onabule v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration detention must remain justified throughout the period of detention. The Secretary of State may detain only for the purpose of deportation and only for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances. Relevant matters include the realistic prospect and timing of removal, the risk of absconding, and delay caused by legal or administrative processes. Detention need not end immediately whenever one matter becomes uncertain, provided the Secretary of State is entitled to allow a reasonable period for clarification or further action. Illness may be regarded as satisfactorily manageable in detention where that conclusion represents the Secretary of State’s reasonable judgment, supported by appropriate medical advice. Satisfactory management does not require optimum treatment.

The appellant, a Nigerian national without permission to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, had been detained pending deportation after becoming appeal rights exhausted in December 2012. She had been detained since November 2011 and was released in November 2013. She challenged by judicial review the lawfulness of her detention between February and November 2013.

King J refused permission to apply for judicial review on 9 December 2013. The appellant renewed her application in the Court of Appeal, advancing grounds concerning the length and circumstances of detention, the prospect of obtaining Nigerian travel documentation, and the management of her mental illness in detention. She also sought permission to adduce a later medical report.

1. Renewed application dismissed. There was no sufficient prospect of success on either ground of challenge.
2. The Hardial Singh principles require the Secretary of State to intend deportation, to detain only for a period reasonable in all the circumstances, and to release the detainee when it becomes apparent that deportation cannot be effected within a reasonable period. The assessment is cumulative. The considerable length of detention was important, but did not itself establish unlawfulness.
3. Delay in judicial proceedings was relevant to the reasonable-period assessment. The proceedings had taken longer than the Secretary of State could reasonably have expected, but that did not mean that the principles had been infringed. The Secretary of State was entitled to consider the risk of absconding, having regard to the appellant’s unlawful presence, criminal conduct and previous findings of a material risk.
4. The Nigerian authorities had accepted the appellant’s nationality and the destination for removal. Their request that accommodation and welfare arrangements be addressed before issuing emergency travel documentation was not a matter for the Secretary of State. After the 24 September 2013 meeting, the Secretary of State was entitled to wait a reasonable period for the Nigerian official to respond. The later listing of the permission application did not require immediate release.
5. As to mental illness, the relevant question was whether it could be satisfactorily managed in detention. That question was for the Secretary of State’s reasonable judgment, and satisfactory management was not equivalent to optimum treatment. On the medical advice available, there was no real prospect of showing that the Secretary of State should have concluded that the condition could not be satisfactorily managed.
6. The application to adduce Dr Katona’s report was unnecessary. The report post-dated the events under challenge, and the court did not need it to determine the appellant’s capacity. No order was made on that application.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): renewed application for permission to appeal dismissed on 16 June 2015.
• High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division, Administrative Court: King J refused permission to apply for judicial review on 9 December 2013.