Wilkins, R. v

A prisoner serving a sentence commits the common-law offence of escape by intentionally going beyond the boundaries of an open or closed prison while knowing that he is not permitted to do so. The prosecution need not prove an intention to remain at large permanently or any particular ulterior purpose.

The prisoner’s motive and the anticipated duration of absence affect seriousness and sentence, not whether escape has been committed. Prison terminology distinguishing an abscond from an escape does not alter the criminal law.

The appellant was serving a sentence at an open prison. After missing a roll-call, he was found in a crop field beyond the prison boundary. He maintained that he had not intended to leave the prison grounds and had intended to return to his unit.

A jury at the Crown Court, before Recorder Dooley, convicted him of the common-law offence of escape. The Recorder directed that the issue was whether he had deliberately crossed the boundary knowing that he was not permitted to do so.

The appeal challenged the direction. Its central issue was whether escape required an intention to remain at large or to pursue a particular purpose outside custody.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Recorder’s direction accurately stated the fourth element of common-law escape: intentional escape from lawful custody.

2. For a prisoner serving a sentence in either an open or closed prison, intentional escape means intentionally going beyond the prison boundary while knowing that he is not allowed to go there. The four ingredients identified in R v Dhillon [2006] 1 Cr.App.R 15 included intentional escape from custody.

3. Neither an intention to remain at large permanently nor a particular object or ulterior purpose is an ingredient of the offence. The court rejected the suggestion, drawn from the jury direction in R v Timmiss [1976] Crim.L.R 129, that an intention to evade the criminal process was generally required. Motive and intended duration may affect the gravity of the offence, but not its existence.

4. The court agreed that the internal prison distinction between an abscond and an escape does not govern criminal liability. Leaving prison custody without lawful authority, even without overcoming a physical restraint, may constitute common-law escape.

5. On the jury’s finding, the appellant deliberately went beyond the boundary into the field knowing he was not permitted to be there. The offence was therefore proved. Although this was at the bottom of the scale of seriousness, it was not so trivial that a prosecution was inappropriate.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — dismissed the appeal against conviction for common-law escape.
• Crown Court — a jury, before Recorder Dooley, convicted the appellant of escape. The lower-court citation was not stated in the judgment.