Munford, R. v

Evidence of a pre-offence internet search may be admitted where it is strongly relevant to whether violence was contemplated or intended and its admission causes no unfairness. Where inadmissible material is inadvertently left in a jury bundle, the judge should follow the applicable protocol by making focused enquiries before considering discharge. A conviction will not be unsafe where the material was not read or disseminated and caused no real prejudice.

A clear written direction on the limited use of lies need not be repeated whenever the lies are subsequently mentioned. In sentencing, a failure to deduct remand custody from a minimum term must be corrected.

Following a trial at Lewes Crown Court, R v Munford and Cowdrey were convicted of murder arising from a planned burglary in which the victim died and his home was later set on fire. Penton was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter, together with conspiracy and burglary offences.

Munford and Cowdrey renewed applications for leave to appeal against conviction. They challenged, among other matters, the admission of a pre-offence internet search and the judge’s response after inadmissible material was found in one jury bundle. Cowdrey also challenged directions on bad character and lies. The applicants challenged their minimum terms, and Penton challenged his life sentence. The common issues were the safety of the convictions and the legality and excessiveness of the sentences.

1. The court refused leave to appeal against the convictions and, save for remand-custody credit, refused leave to appeal against sentence. It granted leave and allowed the sentence appeals only to correct the minimum terms.

2. Munford’s pre-offence internet search was highly relevant. The defence asserted that the experienced burglars had not contemplated violence and acted only in self-defence. The search, made between the abortive visit to the victim’s home and the fatal burglary, was capable of supporting the prosecution case that violence had been contemplated and intended. The trial judge was entitled to admit it and its admission was not unfair.

3. When inadmissible post-offence material was discovered in one jury bundle, the trial judge properly followed the protocol in PD60 of the Criminal Practice Directions. He was right to make enquiries of the two jurors before deciding whether discharge was necessary. The enquiries established that the material had not been read or discussed. At most, the jurors had flicked through it and regarded it as material favourable to the defence. Applying the approach in R v Lawson [2007] 1 Cr App R 20, there was no real prejudice.

4. The directions concerning Cowdrey’s previous convictions did not permit them to prove the allegation in the present case. The written lies direction, required by R v Bullen [2008] 2 Cr App R 25, made clear that his false alibi could not resolve the murder-or-manslaughter issue. The judge did not have to repeat that direction whenever referring to the lies.

5. The 32-year minimum terms for Munford and Cowdrey were justified. Although absence of an intention to kill was mitigating, the planned violence, severe suffering inflicted on the victim, and arson to destroy evidence were serious aggravating features. Penton’s life sentence was justified under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and would also have been justified as a discretionary life sentence.

6. The sentencing judge should have deducted remand custody. The court varied the minimum terms to 31 years and 73 days for Munford, 31 years and 304 days for Cowdrey, and 12 years and 74 days for Penton.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Refused leave to appeal against conviction and sentence except to correct the omission of remand-custody credit from the minimum terms.
• Lewes Crown Court (sitting at Hove): Munford and Cowdrey were convicted of murder and received life sentences with 32-year minimum terms. Penton was convicted of manslaughter and received life imprisonment with a 13-year minimum term.