Tyza v Circuit Court in Wraclaw, Poland

For the statutory oppression bar, hardship must be materially more than ordinary difficulty and must have been caused by the passage of time. A medical condition unrelated to delay cannot satisfy that requirement. On an appeal concerning Convention rights, the High Court reviews the lower court’s value judgment and intervenes only for legal error, a material unreasonable finding, failure to consider a relevant factor, consideration of an irrelevant factor, or an irrational or unreasonable conclusion. In assessing extradition under article 8, the interests of affected children are a primary consideration, but remain part of the overall proportionality balance. A bail curfew is fact-sensitive and may carry no weight where imposed principally because the requested person is a flight risk.

The appellant appealed against a District Judge’s order for his extradition to Poland under a conviction European Arrest Warrant. He had been sentenced to an aggregate term of three years and four months for 13 offences and had served part of that sentence in Poland before returning to the United Kingdom during an authorised break for medical treatment.

He argued that extradition was barred by passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, by the in absentia provisions in section 20, by disproportionate interference with article 8 rights under section 21, and by his medical condition under section 25. The central questions were whether he had become a fugitive, whether he had deliberately absented himself from relevant proceedings, and whether the District Judge’s proportionality assessment could be reviewed.

1. Appeal dismissed. The District Judge’s order for extradition was upheld, subject to a stay until 14 May 2015 to allow a reasonable period after the appellant’s forthcoming ophthalmic appointment.
2. Section 14 required oppression caused by the passage of time. Oppression meant substantially more than hardship, and the burden was difficult to discharge. Even if the period from the 2005 aggregate sentence to the first European Arrest Warrant was considered, the appellant had not shown oppression on the balance of probabilities. His left-eye condition was probably hereditary and was not caused by the passage of time.
3. The finding that the appellant became a fugitive after January 2012 was a primary factual finding. There was no basis for treating it as irrational, perverse or unreasonable.
4. Following the analysis in Bioic v Romania [2014] EWHC 629 (Admin), deliberate absence under section 20(3) required an initiated trial process of which the appellant knew and from which he deliberately absented himself. The District Judge was entitled to find that the appellant knew of and deliberately absented himself from the 2004 proceedings. A right to retrial was therefore unnecessary, and the offences could be considered in the article 8 assessment.
5. The appellate approach to the article 8 value judgment was governed by Belbin v France [2015] EWHC 149 (Admin). Review was limited to legal misapplication, a material factual finding that no reasonable judge could make, failure to consider a relevant factor, consideration of an irrelevant factor, or an irrational, perverse or unreasonable conclusion.
6. The District Judge had considered the appellant’s private life, the effect on his daughter, delay, and the medical consequences of imprisonment. The daughter’s interests were a primary consideration, but the resulting balance was reasonable. The nine-hour curfew was not a material factor on these facts because it principally reflected flight risk. The public interest in enforcing the sentence and extradition arrangements remained substantial. The section 25 ground also failed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): appeal against the District Judge’s extradition order dismissed. The order was stayed until 14 May 2015.