Moreno v The Motor Insurers' Bureau

A leapfrog certificate may be granted where the statutory conditions in Administration of Justice Act 1969, section 12 are satisfied. Those conditions include a point of law of general public importance concerning statutory construction, or a point on which the High Court judge is bound by a Court of Appeal decision. A certificate may also be justified where earlier consideration by the Supreme Court would benefit the parties and other affected claims by avoiding further appellate delay. The existence of a substantial number of similarly affected claims and the likelihood of a further appeal are relevant considerations.

The claimant brought proceedings against the Motor Insurers’ Bureau concerning the law governing the scope of the Bureau’s liability under regulation 13 of the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance) (Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003. In an earlier judgment, [2015] EWHC 1002 (QB), the court decided that English law applied.

The Bureau applied for a certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969, enabling an appeal to proceed directly to the Supreme Court. The claimant supported the application. The central issue was whether the statutory conditions for such a certificate were satisfied.

1. The application for a certificate under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1969, as amended, was granted.

2. The court was satisfied that section 12(3)(a) and section 12(3)(b) applied. The case raised an important point of law concerning the construction and application of statutory provisions, and the judge considered himself bound by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Jacobs v MIB [2010] EWCA Civ 1208; [2011] 1 All ER 844.

3. The alternative condition in section 12(3A)(c) was also satisfied. Earlier consideration by the Supreme Court would avoid the delay and additional cost likely to result from an appeal first to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court.

4. The point was one of general public importance because it affected a substantial number of claims. The earlier appeal in Jacobs v MIB had not proceeded after Homawoo v GF Assurances C-412/10; [2011] ECR I-11603 established that Rome II was not in force at the relevant date, removing the purpose of that appeal.

5. An agreed order concerning costs was made.

This was a first-instance procedural decision. The court referred to its earlier judgment on the preliminary issue, [2015] EWHC 1002 (QB), and granted a certificate permitting a direct appeal to the Supreme Court.