Hicks v Young

[2015] EWHC 1144 (QB)

Case details

Case citations
[2015] EWHC 1144 (QB) · [2015] CN 695
Court
High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Judgment date
24 April 2015
Judgment text

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Subjects
Tort Negligence False imprisonment
Keywords
foreseeability novus actus interveniens contributory negligence false imprisonment trespass to the person escape from unlawful detention remoteness of damage illegality
Outcome
judgment for the claimant
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Where a person unlawfully detains a passenger in a moving vehicle, it is foreseeable that the passenger may try to escape and suffer personal injury. The precise manner or severity of the injury need not be foreseeable. In negligence, an escape attempt may be contributory negligence or, in an appropriate case, a novus actus interveniens. The classification depends on blameworthiness, causative potency and fairness. False imprisonment is subject to a different remoteness rule. Injury suffered during an escape is recoverable only where the escape was a direct consequence of the imprisonment and constituted a reasonable and necessary attempt to end it. An unreasonable escape attempt is too remote, although the imprisonment itself remains actionable per se.

Factual background

The claimant suffered catastrophic brain injury after deliberately jumping from the defendant’s moving taxi. The defendant had driven away from the claimant’s home because he believed that the claimant and his companion intended to avoid paying the fare. The claimant alleged negligence and false imprisonment. The defendant denied causation, relied on the claimant’s conduct, and advanced an illegality defence.

The court found that the claimant had not intended to evade payment, but had been unlawfully detained and had jumped while the taxi was travelling at more than 20 mph. The central questions were whether the jump broke the chain of causation or reduced damages in negligence, and whether the resulting injury was recoverable as a direct consequence of false imprisonment.

Held

  1. Negligence. The defendant owed the claimant a duty to drive with reasonable care. Driving away while the claimant was standing in the rear with the door open was a breach. More fundamentally, it was negligent to continue driving a taxi containing a detained passenger who might try to escape. The taxi was unsuitable for conveying a prisoner safely, and the absence of functioning locks was a warning of the risk.
  2. The injury was a foreseeable kind of damage. It was foreseeable that the claimant might try to leave while the taxi was moving and suffer personal injury. It was unnecessary to foresee the precise speed, mechanism or catastrophic extent of the injury. The claimant’s jump was therefore not a novus actus interveniens.
  3. The claimant’s conduct was nevertheless a causative and blameworthy error of judgment. In negligence, the court must make a fact-sensitive value judgment, informed by fairness, to determine whether unreasonable conduct defeats the claim or amounts to contributory negligence. The claimant’s conduct was careless but not criminal, and it was undertaken after unlawful detention. It reduced the negligence damages by 50 per cent.
  4. False imprisonment. The claimant did not consent to being driven back to the taxi rank, and the detention was not de minimis. False imprisonment is an intentional tort for which damages may be awarded without proof of loss. Injury caused by an escape is recoverable only if the escape was a reasonable and necessary act intended to end the unlawful imprisonment. The claimant’s jump was unreasonable and the injury was therefore too remote to found damages under this tort. Contributory negligence was unavailable in trespass.
  5. Judgment was entered for the claimant for 50 per cent of the damages for his injuries in negligence, together with £250 for unlawful imprisonment, including a modest aggravated element. Permission to appeal was granted to both parties.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

First-instance judgment. The court granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal Civil Division but no appellate decision is stated.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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