Erlam & Anor v Rahman & Anor

An election may be avoided for corrupt or illegal practices without proof that the practices were necessary to the candidate’s victory. General corruption under Representation of the People Act 1983, s 164 requires practices directed to procuring a candidate’s election which extensively prevailed and may reasonably be supposed to have affected the result.

Section 106 applies to dishonest false statements about a candidate’s personal character or conduct. The statutory concept of undue spiritual influence remains applicable irrespective of the religion involved. It is unlawful to use religious authority to present voting for a candidate as a religious duty, assessed by reference to the target audience. Public funds may constitute bribery where a person controlling them corruptly directs payments to induce votes. The election was avoided.

The petitioners challenged the 22 May 2014 mayoral election for the London Borough of Tower Hamlets, in which Mohammed Lutfur Rahman was re-elected. They alleged corrupt and illegal practices, including personation, false registration, postal-vote offences, dishonest statements concerning John Biggs, payment of canvassers, bribery, treating and undue influence.

The claim against the returning officer was withdrawn by agreement. The court therefore determined the allegations against Mr Rahman and whether the election was void under the Representation of the People Act 1983. The central issues were whether the alleged practices were proved to the applicable standards, whether they were committed by Mr Rahman or his agents, and whether they avoided the election.

1. Disposition. The election was declared void under ss 159(1) and 164(1)(a) of the Representation of the People Act 1983. Mr Rahman was disqualified from filling the vacancy under s 164(1)(b). Mr Alibor Choudhury was named as personally guilty of corrupt and illegal practices and was required to vacate his councillor’s office.
2. The criminal standard applied to allegations of corrupt or illegal practices and to whether general corruption occurred. The civil standard applied to whether general corruption might reasonably be supposed to have affected the result. The candidate’s responsibility for agents is broad and includes hand-picked candidates, campaign workers and supporters acting to promote the candidate’s election.
3. The court found corrupt practices through personation and postal-vote offences, and illegal practices through false registration, unlawful voting, dishonest statements under s 106 and payment of canvassers under s 111.
4. Following R (on the application of Woolas) v Election Court [2010] EWHC 3169, the court distinguished political criticism from statements attacking personal character. Calling a candidate a racist was a statement concerning personal character. The press releases were false, dishonest and made without reasonable grounds for belief.
5. Bribery under s 113 may be committed through indirect payments from public funds. A person who controls a public fund and corruptly uses it to induce voters to support him acts within s 113(2). The grants and payments for Bengali-language political broadcasts therefore constituted bribery.
6. Section 115’s prohibition of spiritual injury is not obsolete and is not confined to Christianity. Religious leaders may express political views, but may not use religious authority to represent voting for a particular candidate as a religious duty. The clerics’ campaign and letter crossed that line. By contrast, the intimidation at polling stations, though deplorable, did not reach the statutory threshold of force, violence, restraint or duress to the criminal standard.
7. False statements, bribery and undue spiritual influence had extensively prevailed across the borough and might reasonably be supposed to have affected the result. The court rejected the argument that the candidate would have won anyway.

The judgment records that a Divisional Court dismissed an application to strike out the petition and directed that it proceed before an Election Commissioner. No citation for that procedural decision is stated in the judgment.