Local Authority A v N & Ors

In care and placement proceedings, the court must identify the factual basis for any predicted significant harm and demonstrate the necessary connection between proved facts and the type of harm alleged. Loving and otherwise competent care does not prevent intervention where untreated parental mental ill-health is likely to expose a child to significant emotional harm. Adoption requires necessity: it must be the only viable option, applying the Re B (A Child) approach that nothing else will do. The court must assess all realistic options holistically, including family care, long-term fostering and adoption, and must weigh permanence against the loss of birth-family relationships.

These proceedings concerned two children. The parents sought discharge of an existing care order concerning the older child, C, and restoration of contact. The local authority responsible for the younger child, D, sought care and placement orders with a plan for adoption. The applications were opposed by the parents and maternal grandparents.

Care and placement orders concerning D had been made in December 2012. The Court of Appeal allowed the father’s appeal on 9 October 2014 because the judgment did not give adequate reasons and remitted the matter for rehearing. The central issues were whether the statutory threshold was met, whether C’s care order should be discharged, how contact should be managed, and whether adoption was necessary for D’s welfare.

1. C. The application to discharge C’s care order was refused. Her welfare was paramount, and the court was not required to reopen the circumstances of the original order. The parents had not shown that discharge would serve her best interests. Her current needs required a highly structured and consistent environment, and a return to the family was likely to cause further anxiety and instability.
2. Contact between C and her parents could continue to be refused under section 34(4) of the Children Act 1989. Contact was the norm, but Local Authority B had shown that suspension remained proportionate and in C’s best interests. Possible staged reintroduction of grandparental contact was approved, subject to insight and acceptance of professional advice.
3. D. The threshold under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 was satisfied. The father’s untreated and unacknowledged mental ill-health, together with the mother’s and grandparents’ absorption of his distorted beliefs and their inability to cooperate with services, created a likelihood of significant emotional harm. The required factual linkage between the established circumstances and the predicted harm was proved.
4. The court applied the principle in Re B (A Child) that adoption requires necessity and that nothing else will do. Under Re P (Placement Orders), “requires” meant an imperative rather than something merely reasonable or desirable. The court considered all family-care options holistically and rejected them because none sufficiently reduced the risks. Long-term fostering preserved family ties but lacked permanence and risked continuing conflict and instability. Adoption was therefore the option most likely to serve D’s welfare throughout her life.
5. A placement order was made. The parents’ consent was dispensed with under section 52(1)(b) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002. Direct contact was refused, and annual letterbox contact was approved.

• Court of Appeal: On 9 October 2014, allowed the father’s appeal against the care and placement orders made for D on 13 December 2012, set those orders aside and remitted the matter for rehearing because the reasons were inadequate.
• High Court (Family Division): On 2 April 2015, after rehearing, refused discharge of C’s care order, continued the suspension of parental contact subject to a staged plan, and made care and placement orders for D.
• Court of Appeal: On 14 July 2015, refused the father permission to appeal.