English Bridge Union, R (on the application of) v Sport England

Permission for judicial review should be granted where the papers disclose an arguable ground that merits full investigation at an oral hearing. The permission stage filters out claims that are hopeless, frivolous or vexatious; it does not determine the substantive merits.

Where a public body decides whether an activity qualifies for public sporting recognition, the court may consider the statutory and constitutional framework, the body’s policy and relevant external definitions. A physical component may be a strong indicator of sport, but the issue remains arguable where other recognised sporting classifications point in the opposite direction.

The English Bridge Union sought judicial review of Sport England’s refusal to recognise duplicate bridge as a sport. Recognition would have brought beneficial consequences for the Union. Permission had previously been refused on paper by Haddon-Cave J on 9 March 2015.

The application was renewed orally. The central issue was whether the challenge was arguable and suitable for full investigation, including whether Sport England had lawfully approached the meaning of sport under its governing framework and recognition policy.

1. Permission granted. The renewed application met the permission threshold, although only by a very slender margin. The claim was not hopeless, frivolous or vexatious.
2. The permission requirement is intended to prevent administrative claims proceeding where they disclose no arguable ground meriting full investigation at an oral hearing. It is not a determination of the ultimate merits.
3. Sport England operated under a Royal Charter, regarded by the court as the offspring of the Physical Training and Recreation Act 1937. Section 3(1) concerned grants towards facilities for physical training and recreation. The statutory context strongly suggested that physicality informed the meaning of recreation and sport.
4. The Charter’s objects referred to supporting sport and physical recreation. Sport England’s 2010 recognition policy instead based the meaning of sporting activity on the 1993 European Sports Charter, whose Article 2(1)(a) defined sport by reference to physical activity, while also including mental well-being, social relationships and competition.
5. These materials provided strong arguments supporting Sport England’s refusal, particularly because they indicated that sport required a physical component. They did not, however, make the challenge unarguable. The International Olympic Committee’s recognition of bridge and chess as sports supplied a significant contrary consideration. The substantive challenge therefore warranted further consideration.

The application was initially refused on paper by Haddon-Cave J on 9 March 2015. The claimant renewed the application orally before the High Court (Administrative Court), which granted permission.