Cabot Global Ltd & Ors v Barkingside Magistrates' Court & Ors

Under section 15(6)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, a search warrant must identify the articles sought so far as practicable in the circumstances. The required precision depends on the nature and scope of the investigation. In a broad investigation, computers, mobile telephones and other electronic storage devices may be specified as the articles to be sought where there are reasonable grounds to believe that they may contain relevant evidence, even though they may also contain irrelevant material. The police are not required to use powers of seizure under sections 19, 20 or 50 of the relevant Acts instead of seeking a warrant under section 8. A warrant may also identify cash as cash representing the proceeds of criminal activity where that is a sufficiently precise description.

The claimants sought judicial review of four search warrants issued by Barkingside Magistrates’ Court on 16 January 2014 under section 8 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The warrants authorised searches at business and residential premises linked to an investigation into allegedly clocked motor vehicles.

Permission was granted on one ground: whether the warrants complied with section 15(6)(b) by identifying, so far as practicable, the articles to be sought. The challenge focused on references to computer equipment, mobile phones and cash representing the proceeds of criminal activity. It was also argued that the police should have relied on separate seizure powers under sections 19 or 20 of the 1984 Act or section 50 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001.

1. Application dismissed. The warrants complied with section 15(6)(b) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
2. The court followed the approach in R (Faisaltex Ltd) v Preston Crown Court and others, namely that “material” in section 8 has a broad meaning and may include a computer and its hard disk as a single item. The presence of irrelevant material on the device does not prevent it from being material likely to be of substantial value and relevant evidence. The reasoning in Faisaltex expressly addressed the section 15(6)(b) safeguard.
3. Whether a warrant identifies articles so far as practicable depends on the particular investigation. Relevant considerations include its scope, the nature of the suspected offending, whether the officers could identify the material more specifically in advance, and whether the warrant nevertheless makes the limits of the power sufficiently clear. The present investigation was broad and involved communications, documents, transactions and possible deleted or earlier versions of material. Greater specificity was not feasible.
4. The court applied the reasoning in R (on the application of Rabiul Hoque and Mridul Kanti Das) v City of London Police and The Commissioners of HM Revenue and Customs. Computers and telephones could reveal communications, coordination and the timing and pattern of the alleged offending. The evidence was sufficient to justify specifying those devices in warrants under section 8.
5. Sections 19 and 20 of the 1984 Act and section 50 of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 concern seizure powers. They did not require the police to avoid obtaining a section 8 warrant. Section 50 was inapplicable because the computers and telephones were specified in the warrants themselves.
6. The phrase “cash representing the proceeds of criminal activity” sufficiently identified the articles sought. Section 19(2) did not govern the circumstances in which justices could authorise entry and search under section 8. The warrants were sufficiently clear and precise, including in light of McGrath v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

First-instance judicial review application. The judgment itself records that permission had been granted by Laws LJ and Cranston J on one ground only.