Arava v Court of Constanta, Romania

Under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, the passage-of-time bar requires injustice or oppression caused by the delay. A fugitive from justice will satisfy the oppression limb only in the most exceptional circumstances, and ordinary hardship to the person or family caused by extradition is insufficient.

On an appeal from an extradition decision, the High Court should respect factual findings based on evidence heard by the District Judge unless they are plainly wrong. Where a person convicted in absence deliberately absented himself from the trial, section 20 requires the court to proceed under section 21; it is unnecessary to decide the alternative retrial-guarantee question.

The appellant challenged a decision of the District Judge at Westminster Magistrates’ Court ordering his extradition to Romania to serve a 12-year sentence for murder. The appeal was confined to alleged oppression arising from the passage of time under section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003, and the safeguards for convictions in absence under section 20.

The District Judge found that the appellant had been aware of the criminal proceedings, had deliberately failed to attend, and was a fugitive from justice. The issues were whether those findings were plainly wrong, whether extradition would be oppressive, and, if the appellant had not deliberately absented himself, whether Romania offered the required retrial guarantee.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant failed to show that the District Judge’s factual findings were plainly wrong. The District Judge had heard and assessed the appellant’s evidence, including his credibility, and had concluded that he knew of the proceedings and deliberately left Romania.
2. Section 14 of the Extradition Act 2003 adopts a high threshold. The distinction between injustice and oppression identified in Kakis v Government of Cyprus [1978] 1 WLR 779 remains relevant. Oppression concerns hardship arising from changed circumstances, but the person must show hardship beyond that inevitably inherent in extradition.
3. The approach in Gomes & Goodyer v Trinidad and Tobago [2009] UKHL 21 was applied. A fugitive ordinarily cannot rely on delay resulting from his own flight. Only the most exceptional circumstances, such as conduct by the requesting state creating a justified sense of security, could permit reliance on the passage-of-time bar. The hardship to the appellant and his family fell well short of oppression.
4. Because the appellant had been convicted in absence and had deliberately absented himself, the section 20 challenge failed and the court was required to proceed under section 21. The court nevertheless considered the proposed retrial arrangements. In light of later Romanian legislation and the authorities concerning conditional retrial guarantees, the judge formed the provisional view that section 20(5) would be satisfied, but expressly declined to decide the point because the deliberate-absence finding was independently sufficient.

1. Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Snow ordered extradition on 16 January 2015 and dismissed the appellant’s challenges under sections 14, 20 and 21 of the Extradition Act 2003.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was dismissed. The District Judge’s findings were not plainly wrong.