Wray, R (on the application of) v Attorney General

An application to discharge a vexatious litigant order should be brought before a Divisional Court on notice to the Attorney General. At the permission stage, the Administrative Court considers whether there is an arguable case for that court to determine. Allegations of fraud must have a proper evidential basis. Civil proceedings do not constitute trade and restrictions on bringing them do not amount to restraint of trade. A proposed claim under a repealed statute, unsupported by particulars and resembling the proceedings that led to the original order, may properly be treated as further evidence of vexatious litigation.

In 1996, a Divisional Court made an order under section 42 preventing Bridget Wray from bringing civil proceedings without the court’s leave. The order followed the striking out of several proceedings and the dismissal of appeals and further applications.

Mrs Wray applied to discharge the order. Sitting in the Administrative Court, Mr Justice William Davis considered whether there was an arguable case for a Divisional Court to entertain that application. She alleged fraud in obtaining the original order, incompatibility with the Human Rights Act, restraint of trade, and an intention to bring proceedings under the Slander of Women Act 1891.

1. Application and threshold. The proper venue for an application to discharge the order was a Divisional Court of the Administrative Court, on notice to the Attorney General. The present question was whether there was an arguable case for that court to consider.
2. Alleged fraud. The original order was supported by material contained in the court record, including the history of the claimant’s earlier proceedings and their unsuccessful appeals. There was no proper basis for alleging deceit or fraud by the Attorney General or instructed counsel.
3. Human rights arguments. The suggested incompatibility between section 42 and the Human Rights Act was wholly unarguable. The asserted interference with life, freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment, freedom from slavery, liberty and movement, and private life did not provide an arguable basis for discharge.
4. Restraint of trade. Bringing civil proceedings was not trade, and the order imposed no restraint on the claimant’s ability to trade.
5. Proposed proceedings. The proposed claim concerned a statute repealed by the Defamation Act 2013. The claimant declined to identify the allegedly actionable statement. In the circumstances, and having regard to the nature of the earlier proceedings, there was a significant risk that the proposed claim would be another vexatious proceeding.
6. The court was satisfied that there was no arguable case for the Divisional Court. Permission to bring the application was refused, and permission to appeal was also refused.

The judgment describes the 1996 Divisional Court order and the dismissal of appeals and further applications in the earlier proceedings. This court refused permission for the application to discharge that order and refused permission to appeal.