Bedfordshire Police v Golding & Anor

An interim anti-social behaviour injunction requires proof, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent has engaged or threatens to engage in anti-social behaviour, together with a conclusion that an injunction is just and convenient to prevent it. The court must tailor prohibitions to the conduct requiring restraint. A wide geographical ban affecting the leaders of a registered political party requires careful evidence and analysis of its impact on legitimate political activity, demonstration and expression. Existing public-order controls and narrower injunctions may make such a ban unnecessary or disproportionate.

The Chief Constable applied under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 for interim injunctions against the leader and deputy leader of Britain First. The application followed conduct in Luton on 3 June 2015 and was made shortly before a proposed Britain First march during Ramadan and a community celebration.

The court granted injunctions prohibiting entry to mosques and Islamic cultural centres without invitation, specified threatening or abusive conduct, publication likely to stir up religious or racial hatred, and display of a proposed banner. It also attached powers of arrest. The court refused a wider injunction excluding the respondents from Luton altogether.

1. Statutory conditions. Under section 1 of the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, an injunction could be granted only if, on the balance of probabilities, the respondents had engaged or threatened to engage in anti-social behaviour and the court considered an injunction just and convenient to prevent it. Conduct within the six months before commencement could be considered under section 21(7).
2. The evidence of the 3 June events, including provocative and offensive conduct and the display of a “No More Mosques” banner, was sufficient to support narrower interim injunctions. The respondents’ wider evidence about the cessation of a former mosque-invasion policy did not remove the need for interim protection. A power of arrest was justified under section 4 because the relevant conduct included threatened violence or created a significant risk of harm.
3. The requested town-wide exclusion was refused. The proposed march was already controlled by conditions under the Public Order Act 1986. The narrower injunctions addressed the conduct causing concern. The evidence did not assess the effect of the leaders’ absence on the march or legitimate political activity, nor the wider consequences of excluding political leaders from towns with substantial Muslim populations.
4. The fact that the respondents’ views were fundamentally wrong and damaging did not justify suppressing legitimate expression, demonstration or political organisation where targeted restrictions addressed the identified risks. The events of 3 June did not justify removing the respondents from the march or Luton for all purposes.
5. The interim injunctions were therefore granted in forms (b) to (e), with powers of arrest for three months unless amended or renewed. Injunction (a), excluding the respondents from Luton, was refused pending the full hearing.

The judgment records that an earlier without-notice application on 19 June 2015 was considered by Supperstone J, who required the matter to proceed on notice. On 26 June 2015, Knowles J heard the application on notice and granted narrower interim injunctions while refusing the proposed town-wide exclusion.