Ramathami v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Administrative detention pending deportation is lawful only for the statutory purpose of facilitating removal and for a period that is reasonable in all the circumstances. The Secretary of State must act with reasonable diligence and expedition, and detention must cease when it becomes apparent that removal cannot be effected within a reasonable period.

The prospect of removal need not be certain or tied to a fixed date. It must be realistic or sufficient when balanced against all relevant factors, including detention length, obstacles to removal, diligence, the risk of absconding, reoffending, and the detainee’s conduct. Non-cooperation and deception may extend the reasonable period, but cannot justify indefinite detention.

The claimant sought damages for unlawful administrative detention between 31 December 2010 and 11 July 2011. He had been detained following a criminal conviction and deportation order, while the Secretary of State attempted to establish his nationality and obtain travel documentation.

The claimant maintained that he was Burundian, despite findings in earlier asylum proceedings and language and nationality assessments indicating otherwise. He argued that the Secretary of State had exhausted realistic avenues for removal, had failed to act with reasonable diligence, and should have released him subject to contact management. The central issues were whether continued detention breached the third or fourth Hardial Singh principles and whether there remained a realistic or sufficient prospect of removal.

1. Applicable test. The court had to determine for itself whether the detention was lawful. Under paragraphs 2(2) and 2(3) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971, detention was limited to the statutory purpose of making or implementing a deportation order. The principles in R v Governor of Durham Prison, ex parte Hardial Singh and R (I) v Secretary of State for the Home Department required an intention to deport, a reasonable period of detention, a realistic prospect of removal within that period, and reasonable diligence and expedition.
2. The second and third principles were conceptually distinct. Detention could become unlawful either because the reasonable period had expired or because it had become apparent earlier that removal could not be achieved within a reasonable period. A fixed removal date was unnecessary, but there had to be a realistic or sufficient prospect of removal after balancing all relevant circumstances.
3. Relevant considerations included the length of detention, the nature of the obstacles to removal, the Secretary of State’s diligence, the effect of detention, and the risks of absconding and reoffending. The claimant’s conduct was also relevant. The court rejected an inflexible distinction under which all passive non-cooperation attracted only limited weight. Refusal to cooperate in obtaining travel documentation and deliberate misinformation or deception could carry significant weight, although neither justified indefinite detention.
4. The claimant’s earlier deception, false identity, illegal working, persistent refusal to assist with nationality enquiries, and continued assertion of an unsupported nationality justified substantial weight being given to the risks of absconding and reoffending. The Secretary of State had considered release and contact management under her published policy.
5. Although the nationality enquiries had not succeeded, the Tanzanian and Kenyan enquiries remained live, further initiatives were being pursued, and the Secretary of State had not abandoned removal. On the information available at the time, there remained a realistic or sufficient prospect of removal. The detention from 31 December 2010 to 11 July 2011 was therefore lawful. The claim was dismissed.