Oluwashegun v General Medical Council

An interim order remains binding until it is terminated or revoked. A person cannot disregard it because they believe it was wrongly made, or because it is later revoked. An appellate court reviewing a specialist fact-finding tribunal should respect findings based on witness credibility and interfere only where the decision is wrong. Dishonesty in professional disciplinary proceedings is not necessarily a criminal offence and does not engage Article 7 merely because the conduct is described as dishonest. Serious dishonesty, lack of insight and risk of repetition may justify erasure where lesser sanctions cannot protect the public interest or maintain confidence in the profession.

The appellant challenged a Fitness to Practise Panel decision ordering erasure from the Medical Register. The Panel had found that she failed to disclose conditions on an interim order during applications to two prospective employers, falsely represented that her registration was unrestricted, and acted dishonestly. The appeal challenged the effect of the interim order, the Panel’s credibility findings, dishonesty, impairment, sanction, fairness under Article 6, and the construction of the order’s notification requirement.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant was bound by the 2012 Interim Order during the October 2012 job applications. Her remedy, if she considered the order invalid, was to apply for its termination under section 41A(10) of the Medical Act 1983. Until terminated or revoked, the order had to be obeyed. Its later revocation did not affect its validity or excuse earlier breaches.
2. The GMC’s letter concerning expert evidence did not authorise disregard of the order. It confirmed that the appellant’s registration remained subject to the imposed conditions.
3. The Panel was entitled to accept the GMC witnesses and reject the appellant’s evidence. Appellate interference with primary findings, especially findings based on seeing and hearing witnesses, requires more than disagreement or personal unease. The Panel had given clear and cogent reasons for its conclusions.
4. The allegation was that the appellant acted dishonestly, not that she committed a criminal offence of dishonesty. Article 7 of the ECHR was therefore irrelevant. The Panel had properly applied the Ghosh direction and was entitled to find both objective and subjective dishonesty.
5. Applying Cheatle v GMC, the Panel was entitled to find serious misconduct and current impairment. The dishonesty was repeated, involved professional restrictions, showed lack of insight, and created a risk of repetition. The absence of an expressly particularised example in Good Medical Practice did not prevent the conduct from constituting serious misconduct.
6. The sanction was proportionate. Conditions could not address the dishonesty, and suspension would not sufficiently protect the public interest or maintain confidence in the profession. Erasure was therefore necessary and proportionate. The Article 6 complaint and the argument based on section 1 of the Employment Act 1996 disclosed no error.

The judgment records an appeal from a Fitness to Practise Panel decision dated 11 June 2014, which directed erasure from the Medical Register. The High Court dismissed the appeal.