Accident Exchange Ltd v George-Broom & Ors

On an application to strike out contempt proceedings, the court must not conduct a trial of the merits. Evidence that is presently incomplete, hearsay, or open to challenge does not by itself establish that there is no reasonable ground for alleging contempt. Delay justifies striking out only where it makes a fair trial impossible. A decision not to prosecute does not determine whether contempt proceedings should continue, because the court’s duty to protect the integrity of the justice process is distinct from the prosecuting authorities’ functions.

Accident Exchange Limited brought contempt proceedings against four of seven former Autofocus rate surveyors. Permission had been granted on 1 February 2012. The allegations concerned false statements of truth and, in two cases, false evidence on oath in county court credit-hire litigation. The respondents applied under paragraph 16 of the Practice Direction to Civil Procedure Rule 81 to strike out the committal applications, alleging inadequate evidence, delay preventing a fair trial, improper purpose, lack of public interest, disproportionality and abuse of process.

The City of London Police and Crown Prosecution Service had investigated the allegations but no criminal prosecution followed. The central issues were whether the contempt applications disclosed no reasonable ground, were abusive, or could fairly proceed.

1. Applications dismissed. The contempt claims were not struck out.
2. Under paragraph 16 of the Practice Direction to Civil Procedure Rule 81, the court may strike out where the application and supporting evidence disclose no reasonable ground for alleging contempt or constitute an abuse of process. The court must not conduct a trial of the merits. Present evidential gaps, hearsay objections and disputes about individual allegations were matters for trial.
3. Evidence concerning the wider operation of Autofocus was not, in principle, inadmissible merely because it did not relate strictly and directly to each individual allegation. It was realistically arguable that the evidence should be considered in the round.
4. Delay could justify strike-out on fair-trial grounds only if it made a fair trial impossible. The passage of time and resulting difficulties did not meet that threshold. The trial court should remain alert to such difficulties and ameliorate them where possible.
5. There was no evidence that AEL had brought the proceedings for the improper purpose of procuring a police investigation. The court’s duty to protect the integrity of the justice process was distinct from the police and prosecuting authorities’ functions. The criminal evidential test did not apply to the contempt applications.
6. No proper basis for strike-out was established.