Spanish Judicial Authority v Arranz

In extradition proceedings, an objection that an accusation warrant gives an unfair, improper or inaccurate account of the alleged conduct is properly treated as an abuse of process. It succeeds only where the facts are sufficiently clear to establish that defect. Under section 12A of the Extradition Act 2003, where evidence shows that the requested person could be examined outside the requesting territory, the requesting judicial authority must prove, to the criminal standard, that the person’s absence is the sole reason why a decision to charge or try has not been made. An unreasoned assertion will not suffice. Judicial authorities must honour undertakings given to one another, since mutual confidence and recognition underpin the European Arrest Warrant system.

The appellant faced a third European Arrest Warrant issued by the Spanish Judicial Authority concerning alleged membership of a terrorist organisation and forgery. The Senior District Judge ordered extradition for the first offence but discharged the appellant on the forgery allegation. The appellant appealed on grounds including judicial engineering, abuse of process, specialty, Convention rights, section 12A of the Extradition Act 2003, and article 31 of the Refugee Convention.

The High Court considered whether the accusation was sufficiently defective to constitute abuse of process, whether Spain had remedied its breach of an earlier undertaking, whether the investigation created Convention prejudice, and whether Spain had established the statutory exception to the section 12A bar.

1. Abuse of process. The principle identified in Spanish Judicial Authority v Murua [2010] EWHC 2609 (Admin), and categorised as abuse of process in Zakrzewski v The Regional Court in Lodz, Poland [2013] 1 WLR 324, required the court to ask whether appropriately clear facts showed that the description of the alleged conduct was not fair, proper or accurate. The evidence did not reach that threshold. This ground therefore failed.
2. Specialty and mutual confidence. Spain had breached its undertaking concerning the earlier warrant. The court made clear that it would not have ordered extradition while that breach remained. Spain subsequently terminated the underlying proceedings and warrants, so specialty ceased to be a bar.
3. Convention rights. The investigation had proceeded in the appellant’s absence, but the evidence indicated that he would have an opportunity to put his case before any decision to charge or try. The alleged prejudice therefore did not establish a breach of articles 5 or 6 of the Convention.
4. Section 12A. The guidance in Kandola v The German and Italian Judicial Authority [2015] EWHC 619 (Admin) required a requesting authority to prove the statutory sole-reason exception where evidence showed that examination could take place through mutual legal assistance, video-link or another available means. Spain supplied no reasons explaining why those alternatives had not been used. Its unreasoned assertion consequently failed to establish that the appellant’s absence was the sole reason for the absence of a decision to prosecute.
5. The appeal was allowed and the appellant was discharged. It was unnecessary to decide the article 31 Refugee Convention argument.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal from the Senior District Judge’s decision of 14 April 2015 was allowed. The appellant was discharged under section 12A of the Extradition Act 2003.
• Earlier proceedings: The judgment records earlier decisions concerning the first and second European Arrest Warrants, including discharge under the first warrant and discharge by Westminster Magistrates’ Court under the second warrant.