Wood v Secretary of State for Communities And Local Government

A full planning permission must be construed according to its true scope, having regard where appropriate to the approved plans, the application, the factual context and the development implemented. Under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 75(3), permission for a structure includes its use for the purpose for which it was designed; it does not authorise a materially different use merely because no restrictive condition was imposed. A change from a commercial boatyard use to private moorings may therefore constitute a material change of use requiring permission. The court will not interfere with an inspector’s factual findings or planning judgment unless there is an error of law or irrationality.

The claimant challenged an inspector’s decision on a re-determined enforcement appeal concerning a mooring basin on Thorpe Island, Norwich. The inspector dismissed the appeal under section 174(2)(c) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, finding that private moorings were a material change from the commercial boatyard use authorised by historic permissions. He allowed the appeal under ground (a), granting permission for private moorings subject to a limit of 25 vessels and other conditions.

The claimant argued that the historic permissions authorised unrestricted mooring, that the use had not been abandoned, that the 25-vessel limit was unlawful, and that the inspector’s treatment of a section 52 agreement was irrational. The court also considered procedural applications concerning an extension of time and amendment of the grounds.

1. Procedural applications. The court granted permission to bring the section 289 appeal out of time and to amend the section 288 grounds. The section 288 proceedings had been begun within time, the amended grounds did not introduce an entirely new claim, and any prejudice to the defendants or the public interest was not significant (paras [3]–[5]).
2. Construction of the permissions. The inspector adopted the correct approach to construing the permissions for the basin and wet boathouse. A full permission may properly be read with the approved drawings and, where ambiguity or uncertainty requires it, the surrounding factual context and the development actually carried out. The documents showed that the basin was intended as an integral part of a commercial boatyard or hire-boat base, not as an independent all-purpose mooring facility (paras [39]–[47], [53]–[56]).
3. Section 75(3). The basin could be treated as a building or structure for the purposes of section 75(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The purpose for which it was designed meant the purpose for which it was intended. The absence of a condition restricting use did not enlarge the permission so as to authorise a materially different private-mooring use (paras [49]–[57]).
4. Abandonment. The inspector’s conclusion did not depend on establishing that the commercial boatyard permission had been abandoned. The present private mooring use was materially different from the use authorised by the permissions, which independently established the breach of planning control. The inspector’s observations about the demolition of the boatyard buildings and the 1985 section 52 agreement were compatible with the law on loss of lawful use rights (paras [58]–[68]).
5. Grounds 2 and 3. The restriction to 25 vessels was an exercise of planning judgment which disclosed no error of law. The inspector’s understanding of the section 52 agreement was logical and rational; the agreement was intended to end commercial activity and did not itself grant permission for private moorings (paras [69]–[83]).
6. Outcome. Permission was granted for the section 289 appeal to be argued, but both the section 289 appeal and the section 288 application were dismissed (para [84]).

The judgment does not describe a prior court decision under appeal. It concerns a challenge under sections 288 and 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to an inspector’s re-determined enforcement appeal decision dated 20 October 2014. An earlier inspector’s decision had been quashed by consent, after which the appeal was remitted for re-determination.