Croydon Property Forum Ltd, R (on the application of) v The London Borough of Croydon

Under section 80(9) of the Housing Act 2004, a local housing authority must take reasonable steps to consult persons likely to be affected by a selective licensing designation. The duty does not require every possible step, or targeted consultation of every affected group. The authority has a comparatively wide discretion as to the means used, provided the consultation is widely publicised and nothing goes clearly and radically wrong. A court should assess the consultation exercise as a whole, including its duration, prior publicity, communication channels and the likelihood that affected persons would become aware of it.

The claimant, a company representing private-sector landlords and developers, sought judicial review of the London Borough of Croydon’s decision to designate the whole borough as a selective licensing area under the Housing Act 2004. It alleged that developers and landlords had not been adequately consulted as required by section 80(9). The Council relied on a three-stage consultation lasting from September 2014 to March 2015 and argued that the claim was also brought late. The central issues were whether the consultation steps were reasonable and whether permission should be refused for delay.

1. Delay. The claim was brought within the three-month period in CPR 54.2(1). The delay resulted from raising funds and incorporating the claimant. In the absence of real prejudice to the Council, permission was not refused for lack of promptness. The approach in A v Essex County Council [2011] AC 280 supported that conclusion.
2. Statutory duty. Section 80(9) required the Council to take reasonable steps to consult persons likely to be affected. It did not require “all steps”, “every step” or “all reasonable steps”. Developers and landlords were within the class of potentially affected persons, but the provision did not expressly require particular groups to be targeted.
3. Approach to review. The Council had a comparatively wide discretion over how consultation was conducted. Following the approach discussed in R(Peat and others) v Hyndburn Borough Council [2011] EWHC 1739 (Admin), with reference to R(Wainwright) v Richmond upon Thames London Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 2062 and R(Greenpeace Ltd) v SSTI [2007] Env 623, a consultation would be unlawful only if something had gone clearly and radically wrong.
4. The Council’s consultation was sufficient. Stage 1 alerted many landlords and agents to the later formal consultation. Stages 2 and 3 used extensive publicity through websites, email bulletins, social media, newspapers, posters, flyers, public displays and press releases. The exercise lasted several months and included opportunities for landlords, developers and persons outside the borough to respond. The distinction from R (on the application of Regas) v London Borough of Enfield [2014] EWHC 4173 (Admin); [2015] H.L.R.14 was material because awareness here would not have depended on pure happenstance.
5. Permission was granted on the section 80(9) ground, but the application for judicial review was refused. Permission was refused for the unpursued allegation concerning approval by the Secretary of State.