Gray v Secretary of State for the Communities And Local Government

An application under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, section 288, is confined to errors of law. Questions of fact and planning judgment belong to the inspector. A decision letter must be read broadly and practically, without excessive legalism or sentence-by-sentence scrutiny. Whether a caravan has become a building is a matter of fact and degree. Relevant considerations include permanence, physical attachment, integration with surrounding structures, and the practical possibility of removal. The statutory definition of a caravan remains central, and the relevant factors must be applied flexibly.

The claimant challenged an inspector’s decision concerning two planning appeals. Appeal A concerned the refusal of a certificate of lawful use for a static caravan used as a dwelling. Appeal B concerned refusal of planning permission for an agricultural field shelter. The claimant alleged errors of law, fact, reasoning and approach in the inspector’s decision letter. The claim was brought under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The central issues were whether the caravan had become a building, whether its siting was immune from enforcement, and whether the inspector had lawfully assessed the need and impact of the proposed shelter.

1. The application was dismissed. The court accepted that a section 288 challenge is limited to a point of law. Matters of fact and planning judgment are for the inspector, and the court should intervene only where an error of law is established.
2. The inspector’s decision letter had to be read in a straightforward and practical way. The court adopted the broad approach described in Clarke Homes v Secretary of State for the Environment [1993] 66 P&CR 263 and ELS Wholesale (Wolverhampton) Ltd v the Secretary of State for the Environment [1988] 56 P&CR 69. The claimant’s criticisms focused excessively on isolated words and phrases.
3. In deciding whether the caravan had become a building, the inspector was entitled to apply a flexible assessment involving permanence, physical attachment and the degree of integration with other structures. The possibility that the caravan could be detached, hoisted or removed was relevant. The phrase “permanent appendages” was a convenient description, not a separate legal test.
4. The inspector was entitled to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that the caravan remained capable of being detached and removed, had not acquired sufficient permanence or integration to become a building, and therefore remained a caravan whose siting constituted a use of land. The use had not acquired immunity under section 171B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
5. The inspector had also lawfully considered the proposed field shelter. She was entitled to take account of the short period for which sheep required individual pens, the availability of existing buildings, and the ordinary practicality of moving sheep approximately 90 metres to those buildings. No error of law was disclosed.
6. Costs were assessed in favour of the Secretary of State, with the claimed time for preparing the internal minute of advice reduced from 24 hours to 12 hours.