Sindicato Unico De Pescadores Del Municipio Miranda Del Estado Zulia v International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund

The 1992 Fund Protocol applies to a state only after that state has ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to it. Signature alone is insufficient. Transitional provisions do not operate retrospectively.

The 1971 and 1992 International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds are separate legal entities. A judgment against the 1971 Fund cannot be treated as a judgment against the 1992 Fund merely because both regimes are related or share administrative arrangements. A foreign judgment that is not against the 1992 Fund cannot be registered against it. The 1992 Fund remains immune from jurisdiction and enforcement unless a recognised exception applies.

The SUP obtained an order registering a Venezuelan appellate judgment concerning oil-spill compensation. The order identified the judgment debtor as the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund created under the 1971 Fund Convention. The 1971 Fund had subsequently been dissolved, and the SUP contended that the judgment and registration order concerned the 1992 Fund instead.

The IOPC Fund 1992 applied for a declaration that the order did not concern it, or alternatively for the order to be set aside. The central issues were whether Venezuela could rely on the 1992 Fund Protocol in relation to a 1997 oil spill, whether the two Funds were legally interchangeable, and whether the 1992 Fund was immune from jurisdiction and enforcement.

1. The applications succeeded. The court held that the 1992 Fund Protocol had no application to the 1997 incident. Under Article 28, the Protocol had to be ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to by Venezuela before it could operate in relation to the incident. Mere signature was insufficient. Venezuela did not become party to the 1992 Civil Liability Convention and the 1992 Fund Convention until after the incident.
2. The transitional provisions in Article 36 bis applied only to states which had completed the relevant ratification, acceptance, approval or accession process but had not yet denounced the 1971 Fund Convention. Article 30(3) confirmed that entry into force was state-specific. The provisions did not operate retrospectively.
3. The 1971 Fund and the 1992 Fund were separate legal entities. Their separate decision-making bodies, finances and accounts continued after the 1971 Convention ceased to be in force. Article 36 quater(e) permitted succession only if the 1971 Fund Assembly so decided. No such decision had been made.
4. The Venezuelan Judgment repeatedly identified the 1971 Fund and contained no reference to the 1992 Fund, the 1992 Fund Convention or the 1992 Fund Protocol. References to the plural “IOPC Funds” did not alter that conclusion. The Venezuelan proceedings had involved the 1971 Fund only.
5. The Venezuelan Judgment was therefore not a judgment against the 1992 Fund. Article 8 of the 1992 Fund Convention did not permit its registration. Further, even if the judgment had been against the 1992 Fund, it did not establish liability under the 1992 Fund Convention, so the exception in Article 5(1)(b) of the 1996 Order and Article 5(1)(b) of the Headquarters Agreement did not apply. The 1992 Fund was immune.
6. The registration scheme in sections 175 and 177(4) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 could not support registration against either Fund on these facts. The objection based on failure to file an acknowledgment of service also failed. The application could be made under the liberty to apply in the Registration Order.
7. The Registration Order was set aside in its entirety.

Not stated in the judgment.