London Borough of Tower Hamlets v B

In child-protection proceedings involving radicalisation, conventional safeguarding principles remain applicable. Effective protection requires open dialogue, appropriate information-sharing, mutual respect between professionals and inter-agency co-operation.

Where a child has suffered, or remains at risk of, serious emotional harm from extremist influence within the home, the court must assess whether the child’s psychological, emotional and intellectual integrity can safely be protected there. A protective measure directed principally at preventing flight, such as tagging, may be inadequate where the principal risk is psychological and emotional harm. The welfare assessment must remain individualised: materially different evidence may justify different outcomes for siblings.

The local authority sought orders concerning B, a sixteen-year-old girl, and her brothers after B was intercepted while attempting to travel to Syria and extensive extremist and terrorist material was later found on devices in the family home. B and her parents had previously appeared to co-operate with professionals, but the evidence indicated sophisticated concealment and dishonesty.

The central issues were whether B had suffered, or remained at risk of, serious emotional harm in the care of her parents; whether removal was necessary to protect her welfare; whether less intrusive measures would suffice; and whether the evidence justified removal of her brothers.

1. B’s position. B had suffered serious emotional harm and remained at risk of such harm in her parents’ care. The material found in the household, together with the parents’ sophisticated dishonesty and resistance to effective intervention, meant that her psychological, emotional and intellectual integrity could not safely be protected while she remained there.
2. Safeguarding principles. The court applied the conventional safeguarding principles identified in Tower Hamlets London BC v M & Ors [2015] EWHC 869 (Fam). In cases involving novel forms of vulnerability, protection still depends on open dialogue, appropriate sharing of information, mutual respect for professional roles and inter-agency co-operation.
3. Welfare and proportionality. Under section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989, B’s welfare required an opportunity to live in a peaceful, safe and neutral environment in which her independent judgment could reassert itself. The proposed separation was distressing, but the risks within the family home were of sufficient magnitude to justify it.
4. Less intrusive measures. Tagging and restriction of internet access would not adequately address the risk. The danger was not principally, or exclusively, that B might abscond; it included continuing psychological and emotional harm from extremist material and influence. The approach in X and Y [2015] EWHC 2265 (Fam), where tagging orders had been sanctioned, was therefore distinguishable.
5. The boys. The evidence concerning the boys was materially different. No radicalised material had been found on their devices, they had wider social integration and one had alerted others to B’s attempted journey. Their removal was not authorised at that stage. A thorough social-work assessment was directed before deciding whether their placement in the family home was sustainable.