Hall & Anor v Parole Board of England & Wales

The Parole Board’s statutory task under section 28(6) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 is confined to assessing the risk posed by the prisoner’s release. It must consider every matter materially bearing on that risk, but need not balance public protection against unrelated interests or compare the prisoner’s treatment with that of offenders sentenced under a later regime.

The abolition of IPP sentences by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 was therefore not a mandatory consideration. Article 7 did not require retrospective application of the later regime, and Article 8 did not require a separate balancing exercise. Continued detention remained lawful unless and until the Board determined that detention was no longer necessary for public protection.

Two prisoners serving indeterminate sentences for public protection challenged Parole Board decisions refusing release. They argued that the Board had failed to consider the abolition of IPP sentences and introduction of extended determinate sentences under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, and had failed to consider the effect of continued detention on private and family life.

They also challenged the legality of the Board’s guidance. Mr Hall separately challenged the lawfulness, proportionality and rationality of his continuing detention. The central issues were the scope of the Board’s statutory risk assessment and the relevance of Convention rights and the later sentencing regime.

1. The claims were dismissed. The Parole Board had lawfully applied section 28(6) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.
2. The statutory question was whether continued confinement remained necessary for the protection of the public. That required a fact-sensitive assessment of the risk posed by release. The Board had to consider all matters materially bearing on that risk, but the weight given to them was for the Board. It was not required to conduct a comparison with prisoners sentenced under a different regime or to balance public protection against unrelated private interests.
3. The abolition of IPP sentences under section 123 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 did not require consideration as a mandatory factor. Parliament had not made the changes retrospective, and the Secretary of State had not altered the release test under section 128. The complaint was in substance a challenge to the original sentence.
4. Article 7 did not assist the claimants. The IPP sentence was the penalty imposed following conviction. The Parole Board’s review concerned execution or enforcement of that sentence and did not impose a new penalty or constitute the final judgment for Article 7 purposes.
5. Article 8 did not require a separate proportionality exercise. Family and private relationships were relevant only insofar as they bore on the risk posed by release. Section 30 of the 1997 Act provided a separate route for compassionate release where exceptional circumstances existed, with appropriate safeguards.
6. The guidance was lawful. It accurately identified the statutory risk assessment. It was not required to list every potentially relevant factor or separately spell out the effect of the later sentencing regime, Article 8 balancing, or anxious scrutiny over time.
7. Mr Hall’s continuing detention was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate. The Parole Board had conducted regular reviews and had ample evidence that his risk remained high and was not manageable in open conditions or on licence.

First-instance judicial review proceedings in the Administrative Court. The applications were dismissed.