Oakes v Johansson

A final consent order may supersede an earlier interim maintenance order, including arrears, even where it does not expressly mention the earlier order. The court must apply ordinary contractual interpretation to the agreement and its surrounding circumstances. Where arrears were raised during negotiations, and the final order provides comprehensive substituted arrangements followed by dismissal of the proceedings, it may be clear that the parties intended to compromise and discharge those arrears. An earlier interim order cannot continue after proceedings have been dismissed where the final order was intended to replace it.

The respondent applied for declarations concerning a final consent order made in Schedule 1 proceedings under the Children Act 1989. The applicant had sought enforcement in Sweden of an earlier interim maintenance order, relying on the European Maintenance Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009. The respondent argued that the final order, which created a substantial trust fund and provided other financial arrangements for the child and mother, had superseded the interim order and discharged any arrears.

The central issue was whether the final consent order, despite not expressly referring to the earlier order or arrears, was intended to replace the earlier arrangements in their entirety.

1. The application for declaratory relief was granted. The final consent order was intended to substitute for and supersede the earlier interim maintenance order, including all arrears arising under it.

2. The court applied ordinary principles of contractual interpretation. The parties’ intention was assessed by reference to the terms of the elaborate final agreement and the circumstances in which it was made. The mother’s position before the final hearing, drafted by leading counsel, had included a claim concerning alleged arrears. That was material evidence of the scope of the compromise.

3. The final order provided for substantial funds to be placed in trust for the child, payments and other sums for the mother, and annual maintenance payments during the child’s education. It further provided that, once the respondent complied with his obligations, the mother’s application would be dismissed. Those provisions demonstrated that the final arrangements encompassed the earlier maintenance obligations and any arrears.

4. The absence of an express provision dealing with the earlier order did not alter that conclusion. If the parties had intended arrears to remain outstanding, that would have been reflected in the order’s terminology. It was therefore untenable to contend that the interim order continued after dismissal of the proceedings.

5. The court described the mother’s Swedish enforcement application, which referred only to the interim order and omitted the final order, as abusive. Her request for an adjournment was refused because her position was meritless. The court made the order sought.