A and B (Contact) (No 4)

In determining child arrangements, the court must make the order that best serves the child’s welfare, while respecting the child’s developing autonomy. A child arrangements order for indirect contact may be preferable to no order where it provides a beneficial and structured link with a parent.

An order under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989 is exceptional. It requires a welfare-based and proportionate assessment, and must last no longer than necessary to prevent the identified harm. The court remains responsible for ensuring that an agreed order is in the child’s best interests. A competent child’s agreement is generally required before wider educational information is disclosed, although ordinary school reports may remain available to a parent with parental responsibility unless restricted by order.

The judgment was the latest stage of lengthy private and public law proceedings concerning two sisters, A and B, and their biological fathers and mothers. Earlier orders had provided for direct contact, supervision and a restriction under section 91(14) of the Children Act 1989. Direct contact had not taken place and the fathers withdrew their outstanding applications, seeking only limited indirect contact.

The remaining issues were whether indirect-contact orders should be made, whether the fathers’ entitlement to school reports and school access should be recorded, and for how long a renewed section 91(14) order should operate.

1. Indirect contact. The court made child arrangements orders for limited, structured indirect contact between the fathers and both children. Applying sections 1(1) and 1(5) of the Children Act 1989, the judge accepted A’s autonomy and opposition to an order, but concluded that an order was nevertheless better for her than no order. It reinforced the court’s view that a relationship with her fathers was in her interests, created a predictable framework for communications, and aligned her position with B’s.
2. School information. F1, who had parental responsibility, was entitled to receive annual school reports unless a prohibited steps order provided otherwise. The court distinguished this entitlement from access to wider educational records. A’s competence as a Gillick competent young person meant that her agreement would ordinarily be necessary before wider information was disclosed. The court declined to direct wider access, but recorded in the order that F1 had parental responsibility and the right to receive annual school reports. Meetings with teachers were matters for the school and were considered reasonable up to twice yearly.
3. Section 91(14). The court renewed the order under section 91(14). Such orders are exceptional and may be made only where the child’s welfare requires them. The order must be proportionate and limited to the minimum period necessary to avoid the identified harm. Further litigation was likely to harm the children and M1’s fragile mental health, while a longer restriction extending for six years would unjustifiably interfere with access to justice. A two-year period was proportionate.
4. The court retained responsibility for the final order despite the parties’ substantial agreement. It concluded that further intervention was unlikely to restore direct contact and might cause greater harm. The agreed order was therefore approved and made in the children’s best interests.

First-instance determination by the High Court (Family Division). The judgment records earlier stages of the same litigation but does not identify an appeal from a separate decision to this court.