Michael Wilson and Partners v Sinclair

A court may stay enforcement of a registered foreign judgment under its broad case-management jurisdiction in CPR 3.1(2)(f), even where no writ of control or warrant has been issued. The narrower “special circumstances” test in CPR 83.7 applies to the circumstances specified by that rule and does not displace CPR 3.1. A stay depends on all the facts and circumstances. On appeal, the court should not substitute its own view for that of the lower court where the decision falls within the generous ambit of reasonable disagreement. A complex web of related litigation, the prospect of reciprocal liabilities and the absence of enforcement prejudice may constitute special circumstances in any event.

Michael Wilson and Partners appealed against Master Yoxall’s order staying execution of a registration order. The registration order had registered seven Bahamian costs judgments against Thomas Ian Sinclair as judgments of the Queen’s Bench Division under the Administration of Justice Act 1920, Part 74 of the CPR and the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Order 1984.

The appeal challenged both the Master’s jurisdiction to grant a stay and, alternatively, the exercise of his discretion. The central issues were whether CPR 3.1(2)(f), CPR 83.7 or CPR 40.8A governed the application, and whether the Master’s decision disclosed an error of principle or produced an unjust result.

1. Appeal dismissed. The application and order concerned enforcement of the underlying Bahamian costs orders within England. Treating the application as a stay of the registration order was not merely semantic: within this jurisdiction, and for enforcement purposes, the registration order and the registered orders were effectively one and the same.
2. CPR 3.1(2)(f) confers a broad discretion to stay the whole or part of proceedings or a judgment. A registration order is a type of proceeding or order within that rule. The Master was entitled to exercise that discretion.
3. CPR 83.7 applies where a judgment debtor is liable to execution of a writ of control or warrant. As no such writ or warrant had been issued, the rule did not apply on its plain terms. The court declined to hold that a debtor must await active enforcement before seeking relief under CPR 3.1.
4. CPR 40.8A, which addresses matters occurring since the judgment or order, is complementary to CPR 3.1 and did not preclude an application under CPR 3.1. The application did not in any event satisfy CPR 40.8A’s factual precondition.
5. The appellate court could interfere only for a material error of principle or an unjust result under CPR 52.11(3). Applying the guidance in Tanfern Ltd v Cameron-MacDonald and G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal), there was no basis to substitute a different view.
6. Alternatively, if CPR 83.7 had governed, the surrounding litigation, possible recovery by Sinclair through costs or damages, the connection between the Bahamian costs and the damages inquiry, the potential for set-off, and the absence of enforcement prejudice would have amounted to special circumstances making enforcement inexpedient. Fearns (T/A Autopaint International) v Anglo-Dutch Pain and Chemical Co Ltd demonstrated that set-off between different liabilities may be ordered where just.

High Court (Queen’s Bench Division): Appeal from Master Yoxall’s order dated 9 June 2015 dismissed. The stay of execution remained in place.