English Bridge Union Ltd, R (on the application of) v The English Sports Council & Ors

The meaning of a statutory or charter term depends on its text, purpose and relevant legal and factual context. Repealed provisions may assist in identifying Parliament’s intention when construing surviving provisions, although they have no continuing substantive effect. A statute may be interpreted as always speaking where its purpose and language permit an updated application, but that does not justify changing a historically fixed meaning contrary to the statutory purpose. The phrase “physical training and recreation” in section 3(1)(a) of the Physical Training and Recreation Act 1937 means physical training and physical recreation. In the relevant Royal Charter, “sport and physical recreation” likewise required an essential element of physical activity. A policy adopting the European Sports Charter definition was therefore lawful.

The claimant, the national governing body for bridge in England, sought judicial review of the defendant’s decision to retain a recognition policy based on the European Sports Charter definition of sport. That definition required physical activity and was considered likely to exclude bridge and other mind sports.

The claimant alleged that the policy misconstrued the defendant’s Royal Charter and section 3 of the Physical Training and Recreation Act 1937. The court also considered the relevance of repealed statutory provisions, historical context and the principle that statutory language may be applied to modern circumstances.

1. Claim dismissed. The defendant’s adoption of the European Sports Charter definition of sport was consistent with section 3(1)(a) of the Physical Training and Recreation Act 1937 and with its Royal Charter.
2. A Royal Charter is neither a contract nor a statute for construction purposes. Its meaning is ascertained by asking what it would convey to a reasonable reader aware of the circumstances in which it arose, its purpose and the purpose of the incorporated body. Dictionary definitions of individual words are subordinate to the meaning conveyed by the instrument read as a whole ([32]).
3. In construing section 3(1)(a), the court could consider the 1937 Memorandum and provisions of the Act which had subsequently been repealed. Repeal removed their substantive legal effect, but did not prevent them from assisting in identifying the will and purpose of Parliament when the Act was enacted ([35]–[37]).
4. The principle that legislation is always speaking did not require “physical training and recreation” to acquire a modern meaning including activities with no physical element. The original meaning remained relevant and appropriate to the statutory purpose. Including mental activities such as bridge would require legislative amendment ([38]–[44]).
5. The statutory and historical context showed that “physical training and recreation” meant physical training and physical recreation. The defendant’s continuous history, through its predecessors, was confined to physical activities. That context supported reading “sport and physical recreation” in the Royal Charter as requiring physical activity ([40]–[48]).
6. The defendant’s focus on activities capable of being funded under section 3(1)(a) was legitimate, even though recognition might also confer non-pecuniary benefits and the defendant itself was not subject to the statutory duty imposed by section 3. Those matters did not alter the proper construction of the Charter ([49]–[51]). The use of “vires” in describing the limits of the Charter’s objects and powers was apt; an act beyond those powers would not be void from the outset but would remain beyond the powers conferred ([52]–[54]).
7. The recognition of bridge as a sport by other organisations, or the treatment of other activities, could not determine the proper legal meaning of the Act or Charter ([51]).