Hewitt, R (on the application of) v Denbighshire Magistrates' Court

Apparent bias is determined by asking whether a fair-minded and properly informed observer, having considered all relevant circumstances, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. Disqualification is automatic if that test is met; it is not a discretionary case-management decision based on inconvenience, cost or delay. A remote, purely professional representation will not ordinarily establish apparent bias without a continuing association.

The claimant sought judicial review to quash convictions for common assault and harassment recorded by District Judge Gwyn Jones at Llandudno Magistrates’ Court. She alleged apparent bias and infringement of Article 6(1) of the ECHR because the judge had previously represented people associated with hunting, including a terrierman employed by the Flint and Denbigh Hunt.

The central issue was whether those past professional connections created a real possibility of bias or required disclosure.

1. The claim was dismissed. There were no proper grounds to quash the convictions.
2. The court applied the fair-minded and informed observer test from Re Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 and Porter v McGill [2002] 2 AC 357.
3. Disqualification is automatic where the test is satisfied. It is not a discretionary case-management decision based on inconvenience, costs or delay: AWG Group Limited and Another v Morrison [2006] 1 WLR 1163.
4. The judge had no obligation to disclose his earlier representation of a terrierman. The enquiries made concerned membership of, or a lasting or substantial connection with, hunting or field-sports organisations, not past professional representation.
5. Even if disclosure had been required, the remote and purely professional representation did not create a real possibility of bias. The judge had no continuing professional or social association with the hunt or the Countryside Alliance.
6. The judge’s arrangement for lay magistrates to impose sentence was a pragmatic response to the anticipated length of the recusal argument. He should instead have heard and determined that argument. Since there was no proper basis for recusal at trial, there was none at sentence.

not stated in the judgment.