R. v Cornish & Anor

Pre-commencement conduct cannot itself found liability under the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007. It may, however, be relevant evidence of a post-commencement breach, including a continuing omission or the organisation’s knowledge of relevant facts. The prosecution need not name individual senior managers in a corporate manslaughter charge, but must identify the lowest culpable tier of senior management and explain how its management or organisation of activities caused, or substantially contributed to, the gross breach. Fair notice also requires particulars of the acts and omissions relied upon. A case-management ruling about the deployment of evidence does not necessarily amount to a preparatory hearing under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.

The proceedings concerned charges arising from the death of Frances Cappuccini after a Caesarean section. Dr Cornish was charged with manslaughter by gross negligence, and Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust with corporate manslaughter under section 1(1) of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007.

The Trust applied for pre-commencement allegations to be abandoned or for the prosecution to proceed at common law. It also sought further particulars identifying the relevant senior management and the alleged management failures. Finally, it sought designation of the hearing as a preparatory hearing under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.

1. Application concerning the 2007 Act. The Trust’s application was refused. Section 27(3) prevents conduct or omissions before commencement from constituting the activities, breach or gross breach founding a section 1 charge. Such events may nevertheless be relevant evidence of post-commencement matters, including what the organisation knew, whether a post-commencement breach was gross, and whether an omission continued after commencement.
2. The appointment of Dr Azeez in 2007 could not itself be a constituent element of the charge. The allegation could instead concern the Trust’s continued employment of him in 2012 if his qualifications and training remained inadequate. The case summary was therefore to be corrected by replacing “appointing” with “employing”. The question whether the evidence ultimately proved a breach was for trial.
3. The court declined to order a prosecution for common-law gross-negligence manslaughter. The observations in R v Lion Steel Equipment Ltd concerning section 27 supported the approach, although the court considered it unnecessary to determine the judge’s further analysis of common-law liability.
4. Particulars. The prosecution need not name the individual managers said to be responsible. It was required, however, to identify the lowest tier of senior management said to be culpable and to particularise how that tier’s management or organisation of the Trust’s activities caused, or was a substantial element in, the gross breach and death. The prosecution was also required to provide particulars of the anaesthetists’ acts and omissions and of the Trust’s management or organisational failures. This followed the fair-notice principle described in R v Chargot Ltd.
5. Preparatory hearing. The hearing was not designated as a preparatory hearing under section 29 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. No issue of law had been determined; the ruling concerned evidence and case management. The case was serious but not sufficiently complex or lengthy, and the guidance summarised in R v Gary Quillan, including the limited role of preparatory hearings identified in R v I and R v R, M and L, did not justify designation.

First-instance ruling in the Crown Court proceedings. The judgment records that Singh J had transferred the trial to Inner London Crown Court and fixed the present hearing, but no earlier judgment citation is stated.