Umeyor v Nwakamma (Rev 1)

In a defamation claim, an allegation that documents are forgeries ordinarily conveys an assertion of fact, rather than honest opinion, where the publisher states that they are forgeries instead of expressing a belief or suspicion. The defence of truth requires proof that the defamatory imputation is substantially true. Qualified privilege depends on reciprocal duty and interest, but publication must also be fairly warranted by the occasion. An officer’s entitlement to raise concerns does not necessarily authorise a personal publication accusing another member of forgery. The court awarded general damages where the allegation was serious and likely to cause serious harm, although the publication was limited to members of a community organisation.

The claimant, a former president of an unincorporated community association, sued its treasurer over an email and related circulation alleging that documents supplied to account for a £2,500 donation were forgeries. The defendant relied on truth, honest opinion and qualified privilege, including privilege arising from his duties as treasurer and the alleged right to reply to the claimant’s petition seeking reinstatement.

The central questions were the meaning of the publication, whether it caused or was likely to cause serious harm, whether the documents were forgeries, and whether any defence applied.

1. Meaning and serious harm. The words complained of clearly alleged that the claimant had submitted documents which he had forged or procured others to forge, dishonestly and for personal gain. The wording could not be diluted by more restrained language elsewhere in the publication. The allegation was likely to cause serious harm to the claimant’s reputation, particularly within the community organisation.
2. Truth. The defendant had to prove that the documents were forgeries. That required proof that they failed to vouch either the transfer of 612,260 Naira to the claimant’s Nigerian bank account or the subsequent payment of that sum into the hotel’s account. The defendant failed to discharge that burden. Although the money-transfer document remained suspicious, the deposit slip and supporting evidence made the claimant’s account plausible. The claimant’s failure to provide further evidence did not establish forgery.
3. Honest opinion. Under section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013, the defendant had to establish that the statement was opinion, that its basis was indicated, and that an honest person could have held it on the facts existing at publication. The statement was a statement of fact. The defendant had stated that the documents were forgeries, not that he believed or suspected them to be forgeries. The defence therefore failed, although the other conditions would have been satisfied if the statement had been opinion.
4. Qualified privilege. The relevant issue was whether publication formed part of the legitimate business of the association or was fairly warranted by the occasion. The defendant was entitled to raise concerns and seek an explanation, but his duties as treasurer did not authorise him to decide that the claimant was a forger. The publication was unauthorised by the executive committee, personal in character, and disproportionate to the common interest. The reply-to-attack defence also failed because the publication was retaliation rather than a proper response to the claimant’s petition.
5. Outcome. All defences failed. Judgment was entered for the claimant, with general damages assessed at £2,000.