Prospective Adopters v SA (Father) (Rev 1)

An application for leave to oppose an adoption order under section 47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 involves two stages. First, the parent must establish an unexpected change in the basic facts and expectations underpinning the placement order. Secondly, the court must undertake a holistic judicial evaluation, applying the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration. The parent’s prospects must be substantial and solid, but the test must not be raised by requiring exceptional or rare circumstances. The court must weigh all the advantages and disadvantages of granting or refusing leave, considering the child’s welfare throughout life. The mere fact of placement with prospective adopters, or the passage of time, is not determinative.

The prospective adopters applied for an adoption order in respect of SSM, a child who had lived with them since he was five days old. The father applied under section 47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 for leave to oppose. He relied on his later marriage and successful co-parenting of two younger children, improved engagement with professionals, completion of an NVQ course, and changes in the adoption plans for SSM’s siblings.

The central questions were whether there had been a qualifying change in circumstances since the placement order and, if so, whether leave should be granted having regard to the child’s welfare and the father’s prospects of resisting adoption.

1. The father’s application for leave to oppose under section 47(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 was dismissed. The adoption order was made.

2. Section 47(7) requires a change in circumstances since the placement order. The phrase does not encompass every subsequent development. It refers to an unexpected change in the basic facts and expectations on which the original placement order was based. The altered plan for a sibling, the technical severance of sibling legal ties, improved co-operation with professionals and completion of an NVQ course did not satisfy that threshold. The father’s subsequent successful co-parenting of two young children did.

3. The second stage was a holistic best-interests evaluation, rather than a separate free-standing discretion. The court had to assess the father’s substantial and solid prospects of opposing adoption and weigh all the relevant advantages and disadvantages. The child’s welfare throughout life remained paramount under section 1 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002.

4. The court rejected an over-literal approach to the phrase that adoption should occur only where nothing else will do. Adoption remains a measure of last resort, but the phrase does not require every conceivable alternative to be considered. Nor should leave be refused merely because the child had been placed with prospective adopters or because time had elapsed.

5. Although the father’s later parenting evidence was a positive change, it did not give him substantial and solid prospects of opposing adoption. SSM was settled and thriving with the prospective adopters, required security and permanence, and would face significant emotional harm if removed. Adoption was therefore necessary for his welfare. Any post-adoption contact application would require prior leave under section 51A(4)(c).

Not an appeal. The judgment determined the father’s application for leave to oppose an adoption order and the consequential adoption application.