Marshall v The Motor Insurers' Bureau & Ors

Under article 4 of Rome II, the habitual-residence exception may apply to claims arising from a multi-party accident. Article 4(3) may then restore the law indicated by article 4(1), although displaced by article 4(2), where the tort is manifestly more closely connected with that country. The assessment of whether a fact is proved is governed by the forum’s procedural law, while the burden of proof is governed by the applicable law. Under the Loi Badinter, a vehicle may be involved without direct contact where it materially contributed to the mechanism of the accident. Regulation 13 of the 2003 Regulations makes the MIB liable as if it were the relevant foreign compensation body. It does not make the MIB liable where that body would have no liability because another motor insurer is liable.

Two linked actions arose from a road accident in France. An uninsured French car collided with a Ford Fiesta and trailer while they were stopped on a motorway, then collided with a recovery truck. Paul Marshall died and Christopher Pickard was seriously injured.

Mrs Marshall claimed against the MIB under the Motor Vehicles (Compulsory Insurance)(Information Centre and Compensation Body) Regulations 2003. Mr Pickard brought a corresponding claim. The MIB contended that French law applied and that the French compensation body would have no liability to Mrs Marshall because the Ford Fiesta and recovery truck were involved under the Loi Badinter. The preliminary issues concerned governing law, involvement of the vehicles, and the MIB’s liability.

1. Governing law. French law governed the liability issues. Article 4(2) of Rome II applied to claims arising from a multi-party accident where the relevant persons had their habitual residence in the same country. The use of the singular word “person” did not exclude such claims.
2. Article 4(3) could restore the law indicated by article 4(1), even where that law had been displaced by article 4(2). The provision imposed a high hurdle. The relevant question was whether the tort had a centre of gravity manifestly more closely connected with another country. The accident, the causal driver, the place of injury and the relevant French insurance claims gave France that connection.
3. Evidence and procedure. The standard of proof was a matter for the English court as forum. Article 22 concerned the burden of proof under the applicable law, not the manner or standard by which evidence was proved.
4. Loi Badinter. The Peugeot was involved in both claims. The Ford Fiesta and trailer were involved in Mr Marshall’s claim because the trailer trapped him while he was alive. The recovery truck was also involved in that claim because its presence prevented the forward movement of the Ford Fiesta and trailer, causing the trailer to come down on Mr Marshall. In Mr Pickard’s claim, the recovery truck was not involved: he had no contact with it and it had not materially contributed to his injuries. The Ford Fiesta and trailer were involved because the loss of a wheel explained their presence in the accident.
5. Regulation 13. The MIB’s liability was equivalent to that of the French compensation body. Jacobs v Motor Insurers’ Bureau and Bloy & Ireson v Motor Insurers’ Bureau established that, where the MIB was liable, damages were assessed under English law. They did not decide when liability arose. Because the French compensation body would have no liability to Mrs Marshall where RSA and Generali were liable under French law, the MIB was not liable to her. It was liable to Mr Pickard.
6. The preliminary questions were answered accordingly. RSA and Generali were liable to Mrs Marshall; the French compensation body was liable to Mr Pickard; and the MIB was liable to Mr Pickard but not Mrs Marshall.

First instance decision on preliminary issues. The judgment records earlier decisions concerning related questions under the 2003 Regulations, including Jacobs v Motor Insurers’ Bureau, [2010] EWCA Civ 1208, and Bloy & Ireson v Motor Insurers’ Bureau, [2013] EWCA Civ 1543.