The Royal Society v Robinson & Ors

In construing a will, the court must identify the testator’s intention from the words used in their documentary and factual context. Where the statutory conditions are met, extrinsic evidence, including evidence of the testator’s intention, may assist interpretation. A technically precise expression may bear a wider meaning if the surrounding circumstances show that this was the testator’s intended meaning. A will may also be rectified for failure to understand instructions, subject to the statutory time limit and any permission required for a late application.

The Royal Society sought declarations concerning the construction of Michael Crowley-Milling’s 2009 will. The will stated that it extended only to property situated in the United Kingdom, while the testator held substantial accounts in Jersey and the Isle of Man. If those assets were excluded, they would pass on intestacy to his relatives rather than to the Royal Society, the residuary beneficiary.

The claimant sought, alternatively, rectification of the will or admission to probate with words omitted. The defendants did not actively oppose the claim. The central issues were the meaning of “the United Kingdom” in the will, the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, and whether permission should be granted for a late rectification application.

1. The claim succeeded on construction. The court declared that the 2009 will included the testator’s assets in the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, so that they passed to the Royal Society as residuary beneficiary.

2. The ordinary legal meaning of “the United Kingdom” excludes the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. That meaning was supported by Schedule 1 to the Interpretation Act 1978 and by the constitutional description in R (on the Application of Barclay) v the Lord Chancellor [2009] UKSC 9. However, the expression had to be construed in the context of this will.

3. Following the approach in Marley v Rawlings [2014] UKSC 2, the court considered the words, the document as a whole, the surrounding circumstances and common sense. Under section 21 of the Administration of Justice Act 1982, the evidence showed an ambiguity in the language when viewed against the surrounding circumstances. Extrinsic evidence of the testator’s intention was therefore admissible.

4. The evidence established that the testator intended the offshore accounts to pass to the Royal Society. The will’s geographical clause had appeared in identical form in 2006 and 2009. His earlier wills, instructions, asset descriptions and testamentary arrangements showed no intention to leave those accounts to relatives on intestacy. The court also considered the popular-language reasoning in Stoneham v The Ocean, Railway v General Accident Insurance Co [1887] 19 QBD 237 and the armchair principle discussed in Boyes v Cook (1880) 14 Ch D 53.

5. Although construction made rectification unnecessary, permission was granted under section 20(2) of the Administration of Justice Act 1982 for the late application. Applying the guidelines derived from Chittock v Stevens [2000] WTLR 643 and Re Salmon [1981] Ch. 167, the delay was explained by negotiations, the assets remained undistributed, and refusal would leave the claimant without an easy alternative remedy. The court would, if necessary, have rectified the will for failure to understand instructions.