MM & GY & TY v Secretary of State for the Home Department

The statutory discretion to refuse naturalisation under the British Nationality Act 1981 is a limited safeguard for unforeseen circumstances. It cannot be used to pursue broad public-policy objectives unrelated to the individual applicant’s qualifications or personal attributes. A person who satisfies the statutory requirements, including good character, cannot be refused naturalisation merely to deter other people from extremist activity by threatening adverse consequences for their family members. Such a purpose is remote from the applicant and falls outside the statutory scheme.

A mother and her two adult children sought judicial review of the Secretary of State’s refusal of their applications for naturalisation as British citizens. Each claimant satisfied the statutory requirements, including good character. The refusals were based solely on their continuing family association with the father, whom the Secretary of State regarded as an Islamist extremist, and on the asserted deterrent effect of refusing naturalisation to family members of potential extremists.

The central issue was whether the discretion under section 6 of the British Nationality Act 1981 could lawfully be used for that general deterrent purpose.

1. The claims succeeded. The three decisions refusing naturalisation were quashed. The Secretary of State was ordered to pay the claimants’ costs.
2. Section 6(1) of the British Nationality Act 1981 creates a discretion to refuse naturalisation where the statutory requirements are met, but not a power to grant naturalisation where they are not. The statutory scheme focuses on the individual applicant.
3. The good-character requirement is broadly expressed. It permits refusal where there are reasonable grounds to suspect the applicant’s involvement in crime, terrorism, extremist activity, or other conduct not conducive to the public good. Genuine doubts about character may be resolved adversely to the applicant. The discretion cannot be used simply to revisit those matters where the evidence does not justify refusal on good-character grounds.
4. The section 6 discretion is a backstop for unforeseen individual circumstances, not a broad power to refuse naturalisation in pursuit of general public-policy objectives. The proposed deterrence policy was directed at potential extremists, not at the claimants. It operated regardless of any connection between the claimants and those persons, or of the claimants’ ability to influence their conduct. That purpose was too remote from the applicants and outside the statutory discretion.
5. The Secretary of State’s alternative position concerning severance of family ties was also defective. The decision letters did not explain how severance could affect the outcome, and the asserted deterrent logic lacked internal coherence. The court did not determine the Article 8 or Article 14 issues.