Fullick, R (on the application of) v HM Senior Coroner for Inner North London & Anor

The statutory trigger for a jury inquest is a low-threshold, objective test. A coroner must summon a jury where there is sufficient material to give reason to suspect that the death resulted from an act or omission of a police officer in the purported execution of duty. The court need not determine whether the omission caused the death. Where the discretionary power to summon a jury arises, the coroner must consider all relevant matters, including the family’s wishes, other interested persons’ submissions, the circumstances of the death, medical uncertainties and any resemblance to situations attracting a mandatory jury. The statutory test is “sufficient reason”, not a general interests-of-justice test.

The claimant, the daughter of Susan Sian Jones, sought judicial review of the Senior Coroner’s decision to conduct the inquest into Ms Jones’s death without a jury. Ms Jones had voluntarily attended a police station as a potential witness after being recognised as vulnerable. She later became unresponsive and died in hospital. The coroner concluded that section 7(2)(b) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 was not engaged and declined to exercise the discretion under section 7(3). The central issues were whether there was reason to suspect that the death resulted from a police officer’s omission in the purported execution of duty and, alternatively, whether there was sufficient reason for a discretionary jury.

1. Mandatory jury. The court held that “reason to suspect” in section 7(2) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 is an objective test with a low threshold. It does not require prima facie proof, positive proof or formulated evidence. Information capable of giving reason to suspect is sufficient. The court adopted the approach that suspicion is a state of conjecture or surmise arising at the start of an investigation.
2. Applying that test, the material before the coroner gave reason to suspect that Ms Jones’s death resulted from an omission by a police officer in the purported execution of duty. Her status as a voluntary visitor did not prevent section 7(2)(b) from applying. The court did not decide whether the police should have done more or whether any omission caused the death. Those issues were for the jury after hearing the evidence.
3. The coroner therefore erred in law, and the mandatory requirement for a jury inquest was satisfied. The application for judicial review succeeded and the inquest was ordered to be held with a jury.
4. Discretionary power. The court stated, conditionally, that if section 7(2) had not applied, the coroner would have acted unreasonably under section 7(3). The correct approach is to consider all relevant matters, including the family’s wishes, submissions from interested persons, whether the facts resemble situations covered by the mandatory provisions, the circumstances of the death and uncertainties in the medical evidence. The coroner had failed to consider relevant matters and had applied an “interests of justice” test instead of the statutory “sufficient reason” test. This guidance was expressly not necessary to the result.
5. Other matters. The renewed application for permission concerning advance questions to the pathologist was refused. Management of such evidence is ordinarily for the coroner, who has a broad discretion that the High Court should not fetter. The court also indicated that a coroner considering whether Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights is engaged should give a clear ruling, with brief reasons where necessary.

First-instance judicial review proceedings in the Divisional Court of the High Court. The court granted judicial review of the coroner’s decision and ordered that the inquest be held with a jury.