South Cambridgeshire District Council v Fleet Sother Cooke (aka Paul Sanderson) & Anor

Under Town and Country Planning Act 1990, s 187B confers an original and discretionary jurisdiction to restrain actual or apprehended breaches of planning control. The court must consider all the circumstances. It accepts the breach and does not reconsider the underlying planning merits, but it is not bound to grant an injunction merely because the local planning authority considers one necessary or expedient.

An injunction is strongly indicated where the breach will continue unless effectively restrained, ordinary enforcement has failed, and there is persistent non-compliance or deliberate delay. The court must assess hardship and proportionality. Relief is appropriate where it is necessary for the public interest, imposes no excessive burden, and requires compliance that the defendant can reasonably achieve.

South Cambridgeshire District Council applied under s 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 for an injunction concerning land at Hill Trees, Babraham Road. The first defendant occupied and controlled the land, which had lawful residential and agricultural uses but had become a single planning unit used also for the unauthorised storage and sale of vehicles and other materials. The second defendants, administrators of the estate of Freda Cook, were joined because ownership was uncertain, but took no part.

The Council relied on a prolonged history of enforcement notices, failed appeals, direct action and continuing breaches. The first defendant did not provide evidence and sought an adjournment, which was refused. The central issue was whether an injunction was necessary, expedient, just and proportionate in the circumstances.

1. Jurisdiction and governing principles. Section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 gives the court an original, discretionary jurisdiction to restrain actual or apprehended breaches. The jurisdiction is not supervisory. The court must exercise it for the statutory purpose and consider all the circumstances.
2. The court treats the actual or threatened breach as established for the purpose of exercising its discretion and does not undertake an independent assessment of the planning merits. However, an authority’s view that an injunction is necessary or expedient does not compel the court to grant one.
3. The continuation of a breach unless effectively restrained, the failure of ordinary enforcement, persistent non-compliance and conduct involving prevarication or delay strongly support an injunction. The remedy is particularly indicated where nothing short of an injunction will be effective.
4. The court must consider hardship and proportionality. Where the authority has considered the defendant’s personal circumstances, that ordinarily supports respect for its balance between public and private interests. The order must nevertheless be one with which the defendant can and reasonably ought to comply. Ultimately, the court must decide whether the remedy is just and proportionate: it must be appropriate and necessary for the public-interest objective and must not impose an excessive burden.
5. Application. The first defendant had persistently used the site for unauthorised commercial purposes despite repeated enforcement measures. The evidence showed that ordinary enforcement had failed and that continuing breaches were likely without an injunction. The potential hardship was limited principally to losing a small motor-vehicle business and clearing the site. It was outweighed by the public interest in restoring lawful use of sensitive green-belt land and removing highway-safety risks. The injunction was therefore necessary, just and proportionate. The order restrained actual and apprehended breaches, required cessation of the unauthorised uses and removal of associated items and roadway within 56 days, and included liberty to apply for variation or discharge. The application was granted.