White v Bar Standards Board

An appellate court reviewing a professional disciplinary sentence may intervene where the tribunal erred in law, fact or principle, or exceeded the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible. A finding that a professional acted without integrity remains serious even where dishonesty is neither alleged nor proved. The absence of dishonesty may reduce the gravity of the misconduct, but does not make suspension disproportionate where the conduct undermines professional standards, involves attempts to deflect or conceal responsibility, and occurs against a background of similar misconduct.

The appellant, a barrister, pleaded guilty before the Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council of the Inns of Court to three charges of professional misconduct. The appeal concerned only the three-month suspension imposed for failing to act with integrity by sending an email which asserted that he had the same freedom as a solicitor to conduct litigation and thereby sought to discourage a complaint about his handling of client money.

He argued that the tribunal had treated the conduct as dishonest, wrongly identified aggravating features, failed to recognise mitigation, and imposed a manifestly excessive sentence. The central issue was whether the tribunal’s decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The tribunal’s decision was a reviewable decision under CPR r52.11, but no error of law, fact, discretion or procedural irregularity was established.
2. The appellant’s guilty plea was unequivocal. He had agreed to the amended charge after discussing its terms and had admitted that his purpose was to dissuade the solicitors from complaining about his breach of Rule C73.
3. The tribunal’s use of “knowingly” did not reintroduce dishonesty into the charge. It described a deliberate decision to make the statement, rather than knowledge that the statement was false or an intention to mislead dishonestly. The tribunal had expressly taken account of the deletion of the dishonesty allegation.
4. The tribunal was entitled to find that the appellant had attempted to hide the misconduct or put blame elsewhere, that the conduct undermined the profession in the eyes of the public, and that his earlier disciplinary finding involving client money was similar. The claimed mitigation, including acting in the heat of the moment and genuine remorse, did not require a different conclusion.
5. The seriousness of a lack of integrity in professional conduct was confirmed by Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512. The same principle applied to barristers. Although dishonesty would have aggravated the conduct further, the admitted breach remained sufficiently serious to justify suspension.
6. The three-month suspension was proportionate and fell within the range of reasonable disciplinary decisions. The appeal was therefore dismissed.

• Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council of the Inns of Court: The appellant pleaded guilty to three charges. He was fined for two charges and suspended from practice for three months in respect of the integrity charge.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal against the suspension was dismissed.