Vanden Recycling Ltd v Bevin Tumulty Bolton Brothers Ltd & Anor

A satisfied consent judgment fixing damages for the same loss bars continuation of a claim against another joint or concurrent tortfeasor liable for that loss. The rule applies even where the claims arise from employee competition, conspiracy, inducement of breach of contract and misuse of confidential information. The substance of a consent order governs its effect: an order recording agreed terms and payment of a specified sum is a consent judgment, even if it is not labelled a judgment. Once the judgment is satisfied, the cause of action is extinguished against the other tortfeasors. The appropriate disposal is summary judgment where the remaining claim has no real prospect of success; the circumstances do not necessarily amount to an abuse of process.

Vanden brought claims against an employee and two companies arising from an alleged concerted scheme to misuse confidential commercial information and compete with its business. The claims included breach of contract, inducement of breach, breach of confidence and conspiracy by unlawful means.

Vanden settled with Bolton by a consent order requiring payment of £275,000, comprising damages and costs, and obtained judgment against Tumulty with damages to be assessed. Kras subsequently applied to strike out the claim as an abuse of process or under CPR 3.4(2)(b), alternatively for summary judgment, arguing that satisfaction of the Bolton judgment barred continuation of the claim against Kras.

1. Application granted. The claim against Kras was disposed of by summary judgment because, on the pleaded case, the claimant had no real prospect of recovering the same damage again from another tortfeasor.
2. The pleaded case alleged that all three defendants acted in concert. The contractual breaches, inducement, misuse of confidential information and conspiracy were presented as parts of common unlawful conduct causing common damage. The individual heads of wrongdoing were subsumed in the overall conspiracy, so the claim was one against joint wrongdoers liable for the same damage.
3. The order made against Bolton was a final consent judgment. It took effect when made under CPR 40.7. Its substance governed its character: the absence of the word judgment did not reduce its status. The parties had chosen a court order incorporating agreed settlement terms, rather than a Tomlin order in which the settlement terms would be scheduled and the proceedings stayed.
4. Section 3 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, replacing and extending the former rule in section 6(1)(a) of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935, permits proceedings against another person jointly liable for the same damage after judgment, but a satisfied judgment bars continuation of the claim against the other tortfeasors. The principles stated in Bryanston Finance Ltd v de Vries [1975] 1 QB 703 and Jameson v CEGB [1998] 1 AC 455 applied.
5. Paragraph 5 of the Bolton order, reflecting section 3 of the 1978 Act, did not preserve the claim against Kras after satisfaction. The court declined to characterise the claim as an abuse of process under CPR 3.4(2)(b); the alternative grounds concerning the Tumulty settlement and the adequacy or value of the pleading were left undecided.

The parties were directed to agree the appropriate order or make written submissions concerning its form.