Cruelty Free International (formerly the Buav), R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anor

Under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, a decision-maker need not await the final form of an inspectors’ report before acting on licence breaches or sanctions. The question is whether sufficient information was available to make a properly informed decision, judged on the facts of the case. A statutory or commissioned report is not automatically a mandatory material consideration.

Classification of non-compliance under non-statutory guidance is an evaluative task for scientifically qualified inspectors. The presence of one listed characteristic does not compel a particular category. Judicial review does not permit the court to substitute its assessment for that of the specialist regulator, and no general duty required further reasons for the inspectors’ categorisation in these circumstances.

The claimant, a campaigning organisation concerned with the protection of animals used in scientific procedures, challenged the Secretary of State’s regulation of alleged licence breaches at Imperial College London. The challenge concerned a Compliance Notice and sanctions imposed after an investigation under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986.

Permission was granted on four grounds. One ground was abandoned and another was compromised by agreement to amend a published report. The remaining grounds alleged that action was unlawful because the decision-maker acted before the inspectors’ report was finalised, lacked sufficient material information, and irrationally treated two infringements as Category B rather than Category C under non-statutory guidance.

1. The claim for judicial review was dismissed. The agreed amendment to the published report resolved the discrete third ground, and the fourth ground was not pursued.
2. The investigation was undertaken under the inspectors’ general functions in section 18(2) of the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986, rather than pursuant to a formal direction under section 18(2A). In either event, the Act did not require the Secretary of State, Minister or authorised civil servant to wait for a report under section 18(2A)(c) before deciding whether breaches had occurred or what sanctions should be imposed. Section 18(2A)(d) did not, expressly or by necessary implication, fetter the general enforcement powers in section 11.
3. A report commissioned under section 18(2A) is not automatically a mandatory material consideration. In ordinary cases it may be prudent to await the report, but lawfulness depended on whether the decision-maker already possessed enough information to make a properly informed decision. The evidence showed that sufficient information had been supplied, and there was a legitimate reason to act before publication of a separate independent report.
4. The Minister’s role was, at most, to approve the recommended sanctions and the Compliance Notice; the expert ASRU officials had determined the breaches and their categories. The briefing materials accurately identified the infringements, breached conditions, categories and recommended sanctions. Applying the principle that civil servants’ knowledge is not automatically imputed to a Minister, the Minister nevertheless had sufficient relevant information.
5. The categorisation of the two infringements was an evaluative specialist judgment. The non-statutory guidance did not create rigid rules: the presence of one listed characteristic did not compel classification in a particular category. The inspectors had explained their conclusions, and there was no public law error, irrationality or obligation to provide CFI with further reasons.