Al-Baker v Al-Baker

A European arrest warrant is unavailable for civil contempt, even where imprisonment has been imposed. A statement verified by a statement of truth is not an affidavit and a false statement is not perjury, although it may constitute contempt of court. During pending proceedings, the court should not refer to the police an allegation of perjury where the truth of that allegation remains an issue for determination in the proceedings. A fresh application may be made after judgment and findings have been given.

The applicant sought permission to disclose documents to the police and asked the court to refer the respondent for alleged perjury during the ongoing financial proceedings. The application relied partly on a false statement verified by a statement of truth and partly on an affidavit containing a disputed assertion about property ownership in the United Arab Emirates.

The court also corrected an earlier judgment, [2015] EWHC 3229 (Fam), which had stated that the respondent’s civil contempt sentence could be backed by a European arrest warrant. The central issues were whether the alleged conduct amounted to perjury and whether referral to the police was appropriate before the court had determined the disputed facts.

1. The court corrected its earlier judgment. Having regard to R v O'Brien [2014] UKSC 23, a European arrest warrant could not be sought by the wife’s counsel and the European arrest warrant scheme did not encompass civil contempt, even where the contempt resulted in imprisonment. The earlier paragraph was deleted.

2. A false statement verified by a statement of truth under Part 17 of the Family Procedure Rules is not a sworn affidavit. Falsity in such a statement may constitute contempt of court, but does not amount to perjury. Criminal proceedings for perjury therefore could not be based on the statement relied upon.

3. The affidavit allegation concerning ownership of property remained disputed. The authenticity and meaning of the documents relied upon were central matters for the trial judge. It would be premature and wrong to refer the allegation to the police before judgment on those same matters.

4. The application was dismissed. The dismissal did not prevent a fresh application after judgment and factual findings had been made. No order was made as to costs.

5. Permission to appeal was refused under rule 30.3(7) of the Family Procedure Rules, because the proposed appeal had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason for it to be heard.

This was a first-instance decision. The judgment corrected the court’s earlier decision, [2015] EWHC 3229 (Fam), and refused permission to appeal.