Al Hamadani & Anor v Al Khafaf & Ors

For harassment claims under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, conduct may be attributed to a participant in a joint venture where he aids, abets, counsels or procures another’s conduct. A single incident may be sufficient to justify an injunction based on apprehended further harassment, although it may not establish the course of conduct required for damages. The threshold is high: conduct must be objectively likely to cause alarm or distress and must be oppressive and unacceptable, rather than merely unreasonable. Where a defendant knowingly joins a late-night intimidating visit to a home, the conduct may cross that threshold even if the defendant attempts to moderate events. A court may grant a permanent injunction where the conduct and continuing risk justify it.

The claimants, brothers and antique dealers, sought injunctions under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 against five defendants. Their claims against four defendants had settled by consent. The trial therefore concerned only the third defendant, who did not appear or participate.

The claim arose from a late-night visit by four men to the claimants’ home and business premises, allegedly to intimidate them into returning goods claimed by another defendant. The court also had to determine whether the claimants could rely on evidence served late and whether the conduct attributable to the third defendant justified permanent injunctive relief.

1. The court granted permission and relief from sanctions so that the claimants could rely on their additional witness statements and the video transcript and translation. Earlier evidential defaults were technical and insignificant. The later breach was serious and significant, but the delay was under three weeks, the evidence was served more than two months before trial, and the defendant could have applied for relief from his own debarring sanction.
2. Under CPR 8.6(1), written evidence cannot be relied on unless served in accordance with the rules or admitted by permission. The provision operates as an automatic sanction requiring relief under CPR 3.9. The three-stage approach in Denton v TH White Ltd—seriousness and significance, the reason for default, and all the circumstances—was applicable.
3. Liability for harassment may arise where a defendant participates in a joint venture. Section 7(3A) of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 attributes to an aider and abettor the relevant conduct, knowledge, purpose and foresight of the person whose conduct was aided. The subsection was not confined to criminal liability.
4. The statutory threshold was satisfied in relation to the first claimant. The defendant knowingly participated in a joint venture to enter the claimants’ home late at night, without invitation and using deception, to intimidate them. That conduct was objectively calculated to cause alarm or distress, oppressive and unacceptable, and markedly worse than unreasonable. The conduct of the group leader was attributable to the defendant, and the defendant’s own participation independently met the threshold.
5. A single occasion could not itself establish the course of conduct needed for a damages claim under section 1(1). It could nevertheless justify an injunction based on a reasonable apprehension of further similar conduct. The subsequent threatening message, communicated on behalf of the defendants, supplied a second occasion and amounted to harassment of the first claimant. The absence of contrition, undertaking or promise not to repeat the conduct supported permanent relief for both claimants.
6. The court did not find that the statutory threshold had been crossed against the second claimant in respect of the main incident, because he was not a witness to it. Nevertheless, the nature of the subsequent threat and the continuing risk justified an injunction restraining harassment of both claimants. The claim against the third defendant succeeded, and an injunction was granted in the terms sought, subject to a modification permitting communication with a claimant if that claimant later consented.