Nottingham City Council v Calverton Parish Council

For a statutory period governing the bringing of proceedings, the final date normally remains the final calendar day, including weekends and bank holidays. An exception applies where the act requires the court office to function and that office is closed throughout the final day: the period is construed as ending on the next working day. The rule applied to a challenge under section 113(4) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. It does not confer a discretionary extension and does not address closure only outside normal hours. Applications to quash development plan documents require court co-operation because the claim must be issued or received through the court office.

Calverton Parish Council brought a claim under section 113 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 seeking to quash aspects of a development plan document adopted by Nottingham City Council and two other local planning authorities.

The City Council adopted the document on 8 September 2014. The six-week period apparently expired on Sunday 19 October 2014, when the court office was closed. The claim was issued on Monday 20 October 2014. The City Council applied to strike out the claim against it as out of time. The central issue was whether the statutory period ended on the Sunday or on the next working day.

The City Council’s application to strike out the claim against it was dismissed. The claim was brought within the period prescribed by section 113(4) of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004.

1. General approach. The authorities established that statutory periods ordinarily include non-working days and that the court has no power to extend a statutory limitation period. The six-week period under section 113(4) begins on the date on which the local planning authority resolves to adopt the development plan document, runs for 42 days and ordinarily ends at midnight on the final day. The court referred to Barker v Hambleton District Council [2013] PTSR 41, Hinde v Rugby Borough Council [2012] JPL 816 and Stainer v Secretary of State for the Environment (1983) 65 P & C.R. 310.
2. Closed court office. Following the approach in Pritam Kaur v S. Russell & Sons Ltd. [1973] 1 Q.B. 336, and the analogous decisions including Aadan v The Mayor & Burgess of the London Borough of Brent [2000] 32 H.L.R. 848, Re Philipp and Lion Ltd. [1994] B.C.C. 261 and Mucelli v Government of Albania [2009] 1 W.L.R. 276, where proceedings require the court office to be functioning and the final day is one on which it is closed throughout, the statutory period ends on the next day when the office is open.
3. Nature of the application. An application under section 113 cannot be made unilaterally. It must be made to the High Court under the procedural rules, and issuing or receipt of the claim requires action by a court officer. The contrast with Swainston v Hetton Victory Cluib Ltd. [1983] 1 All E.R. 1179, where presentation to an employment tribunal was a unilateral act, supported that conclusion.
4. Application and limits. The final day was Sunday 19 October 2014, when the court office was closed. The period therefore expired on Monday 20 October 2014, when the claim was issued. The decision was confined to whole-day closure and did not determine the position where the office was open during normal hours but closed for only the final few hours before midnight.