Union Marine Classification Services LLC v The Government of the Union of Comoros

An application under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 concerns substantive jurisdiction. It is not the proper route for challenging an arbitrator’s alleged misuse of the power to correct or supplement an award. Such a complaint may fall under section 68(2)(b), subject to its requirements and time limits.

Whether a claim was dealt with must be decided by reading the award as a whole, including its reasons and dispositive provisions. An arbitrator may correct an accidental slip or omission where the original award addressed liability but inadvertently failed to determine related accounting or quantum claims.

Union Marine applied under section 67(1)(a) and/or (b) of the Arbitration Act 1996 to set aside, or declare ineffective, an amended award issued by the sole arbitrator in an arbitration concerning termination of a commercial outsourcing agreement.

The original award rejected the Government’s case that serious payment breaches justified termination and stated that both sides’ claims and counterclaims failed. The arbitrator later issued an amended award under section 57(3) of the Act and the LMAA Terms, determining claims for an account and minimum monthly payments which he had inadvertently omitted. The central issues were whether section 67 provided an available challenge and whether the amended award was permitted.

1. Section 67 jurisdiction. The application was rejected because the complaint concerned the arbitrator’s alleged excess of power in correcting or adding to an award, not the tribunal’s substantive jurisdiction. Section 30(1)(c), incorporated by section 82(1), required identification of the matters submitted to arbitration. The matters addressed by the amended award had been submitted. Section 1(c) also supported a restrained approach to court intervention. Section 68(2)(b) was the potentially appropriate route, but the late application was refused because it was procedurally inappropriate, out of time and unsupported by evidence of substantial injustice.
2. Construction of the original award. The award had to be read as a whole. Paragraph 72, although expressed broadly, appeared in the section addressing whether serious breaches justified termination. Properly understood, it rejected the central allegation of a serious and dishonest payment breach, rather than finally determining every amount payable under the contract. The related minimum-payment and accounting claims concerned quantum and had not been the focus of the liability hearing.
3. Correction of accidental omission. The arbitrator had not re-evaluated the evidence or changed his mind. He had inadvertently omitted the accounting claims and the minimum-payment claim. That omission was within the power to correct under section 57(3)(a), or paragraph 25 of the LMAA Terms, even if section 57(3)(b) did not apply. The amendment to the dispositive part was consequently permissible.
4. The application was dismissed. The parties were directed to prepare a draft order, including costs.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.