Milroy v British Telecommunications Plc

Training is inadequate where an employer introduces a substantial change to a safety-critical system but gives only limited, poorly reinforced computer-based instruction, particularly where the relevant work is unusual and the consequences of error are grave. A safe system must account for the practical limits of human precision when work is undertaken near high-voltage power lines. A ground support person has a safety function extending beyond protecting persons on the ground: the person must remain positioned to observe and guide the operator. Where breaches of statutory duty and workplace duties substantially cause injury, an employee’s contributory negligence does not necessarily eliminate liability. Apportionment requires consideration of both causative potency and blameworthiness.

The claimant, an engineer employed by BT, suffered serious injury when operating a mobile elevated work platform near overhead high-voltage power lines. He alleged breaches of the common law duty of care, the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 and the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, together with vicarious liability for breaches by a fellow employee.

BT contended that its system of work was adequate and that the accident was caused wholly or principally by the claimant’s own negligence. The court determined liability, including the adequacy of training, the safety of the system actually used, the fellow employee’s conduct, causation and contributory negligence.

1. Admissibility and evidence. The claimant’s witness statement was admissible. His cognitive impairments affected the weight of his evidence but did not establish incompetence to give an account of working practices and the accident. His absence from cross-examination had limited effect because his memory ended before the critical decision-making.
2. Adequacy of training. BT had introduced a substantial change from a previous system to one requiring a two-metre red sector around high-voltage power lines, an on-site risk assessment and a second trained operator acting as ground support. Merely placing the revised guidance in an electronic file did not provide sufficient notice. The single computer-based training session, delivered amongst numerous unrelated activities, did not adequately address or reinforce the critical aspects of the new system. The training was therefore inadequate within Regulation 9(1) of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998 (paras [11]-[22]).
3. Unsafe working system. The stepped method used by the claimant, although supported by the engineering evidence as potentially safe if carefully performed, was unsafe in the circumstances. A MEWP could not safely be operated so close to high-voltage lines because minor inattention could have catastrophic consequences. The system therefore gave rise to danger contrary to Regulation 4(3) of the Electricity at Work Regulations 1989 (paras [27]-[29]).
4. Ground support and vicarious liability. The fellow employee was not a trained MEWP operator and should have remained on the ground as the ground support person. By entering the bucket, he removed the proper lookout and failed to consider an available method of working that avoided using the MEWP near the power lines. BT was vicariously liable for those causative breaches (paras [30]-[34]).
5. Causation and contributory negligence. BT’s statutory breaches and the fellow employee’s breaches were substantial and significant causes of the accident. The claimant was also negligent in moving the bucket into danger and permitting the fellow employee to enter it. Applying the general balance between causative potency and blameworthiness identified in Jackson v Murray [2015] UKSC 5, the appropriate reduction was one third. Judgment was entered for the claimant on liability, subject to that reduction, with directions for a case management conference on quantum (paras [35]-[40]).